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ABSTRACT 
This thesis discusses whether the collection of metadata by the NSA, as revealed in 2013 
by Edward Snowden, from domestic sources is legal and/or effective, and how to balance 
safety and liberty.  The topic is both timely and important due to the potential for abuse 
that comes with domestic intelligence programs, as well as the risk of suffering a terrorist 
attack on U.S. soil.  Research for this thesis included personal interviews with former 
NSA and CIA Director Michael Hayden, and reviewing numerous court cases, legal 
documents, and articles and books on the subject.  There is significant evidence that the 
NSA’s mass collection of metadata violates the 4th Amendment, while the FISA Court 
fails to meet the Case and Controversy and impartial magistrate requirements of the 
Constitution.  Alternatively, it can be argued that the Necessary and Proper Clause, the 
3
rd
 Party Doctrine, and the governmental responsibility to protect and defend the people 
outweigh such concerns.  Questions of efficacy are almost impossible to fully explore due 
to the need to access classified information to do so, but many experts have declared that 
there is significant evidence that the programs addressed herein are effective in the fight 
against terrorists.  The result of this research is that these programs do violate the law, but 
with minor tweaks or concessions they can operate fully within constitutional boundaries, 
and while they may not have enormous effects on counterterrorism, enough good has 
come from them that it would be improper to shut them down. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States of America was founded upon the idea that government must 
be subordinate to the populace, a “government of the people, by the people, [and] for the 
people.”1  President Abraham Lincoln unintentionally expressed well the contradictory 
nature of the U.S. federal government, which by its very charter operates with the consent 
of the people and counts among its responsibilities
 
the protection of the people, for their 
own sake and for that of the government.
2
  In the 21
st
 century, when the threats facing the 
United States, its allies, and most importantly its people, are unlike any imagined by the 
founding fathers, and technology has allowed war to progress from a battle of muskets to 
one of keystrokes, the legal and ethical waters are even more muddied than ever. 
If government is responsible for protecting the people and the state, what should 
be the limits of its authority to do so?  For that matter, if the threat is grave enough, or 
immediate enough, are there any limits?  These are the questions that confront policy 
makers, congressional overseers, judges and, most importantly the American people in 
the wake of dramatic revelations in 2013 by a former National Security Agency (NSA) 
contractor of mass “surveillance” operations undertaken by the United States 
government.
3
  In a government that is intended to be a protector of the people, from itself 
                                                 
1
 Abraham Lincoln, “The Gettysburg Address” (speech, dedication of the Soldiers’ National 
Cemetery, Gettysburg, PA, November 19, 1863), reproduced at 
http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm 
2
 “Constitution of the United States,” U.S. Archives, accessed September 6, 2015, 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html.  The Preamble to the Constitution 
of the United States begins with the declaration that “the People” have established the government.  The 
Preamble and several articles include references to the governmental responsibility for protecting the 
interests and safety of the citizenry. 
3
 See Glenn Greenwald, “NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers 
Daily,” Guardian (London), June 6, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-
 2 
and from external threats, there is a line, one that is continually redrawn by quarrels 
between the government and its citizenry, which determines what is acceptable for the 
protector to undertake in order to accomplish that particular part of its charter.  The 
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides a framework within 
which this line must remain, never varying too far from the specifics articulated in the 
search and seizure limitations of the amendment. (See Appendix A) 
The question of what is permissible is only likely to grow more complicated as 
time goes on.  As it is, many of the issues surrounding government surveillance that arose 
in 2013 appear to be a result of new capabilities rather than “malicious” intent on the part 
of the United States government.  In the words of former National Security Agency and 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director General Michael Hayden (USAF, Ret.), the 
NSA is “getting far more incidental collection now than [it has] in the past, just because 
of the nature [of the] technology” available.4  If Moore’s Law, which postulates that 
computing power doubles every two years,
5
 is accepted to be true, technology will 
continue to improve in the years ahead, and in doing so continue to risk further 
“incidental” collection by the government that could potentially affect the constitutionally 
protected files, communications, and data of American citizens.  The intelligence 
community is built on the predilection that such collection is a positive.  As former senior 
intelligence community official Mark Lowenthal wrote, “[t]he intelligence community 
                                                                                                                                                 
records-verizon-court-order; and Glenn Greenwald, et al, “Microsoft Handed the NSA Access to Encrypted 
Messages,”  Guardian (London), July 12, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-
nsa-collaboration-user-data 
4
 Michael Hayden (retired General, United States Air Force, former Director, Central Intelligence 
Agency and National Security Agency, former Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence) in 
discussion with the author, September 21, 2015 
5
 “Moore’s Law,” www.mooreslaw.org, accessed January 13, 2016, http://www.mooreslaw.org/ 
 3 
would rather collect more than less.”6  General Hayden addressed the issue even more 
simply, saying that in the days immediately following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, “when 
the decisions were made, all ties went to, ‘bulk up the collection.’”7  Thus, even with 
2015’s changes to the legal authorization for metadata collection,8 the question of what is 
appropriate, legal, and acceptable remains salient; in fact, because of the risks that the 
future holds for potential abuse of authority, the question has even more importance than 
it did when journalists Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras exposed the leaked documents 
provided by Edward Snowden in 2013.  What is collected, the amount that is collected, 
and even how it is accessed and stored, is up for debate at this time.  With a population 
that is largely ambivalent about government intrusion into their lives, there is always the 
opportunity for the National Security Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), or 
any of the other intelligence and law enforcement agencies to push the boundaries of 
acceptable conduct in their ongoing quest to secure the United States and American 
citizens abroad from the threat of a terrorist attack.  Following the publication of articles 
in 2006 regarding illegal NSA activities,
9
 Americans split fairly evenly on the issue of 
whether the U.S. government should conduct domestic surveillance as part of its 
                                                 
6
 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence:  From Secrets to Policy, Fifth Edition (Los Angeles, CA:  CQ 
Press, 2012), 208 
7
 Hayden, in discussion with the author, September 21, 2015 
8
 See “H.R. 2048:  Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending 
Eavesdropping, Dragnet-Collection and Online Monitoring (USA FREEDOM) Act of 2015 (114
th
 
Congress, 2015-2016),” Library of Congress, https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ23/PLAW-
114publ23.pdf.  This bill, which was signed into law in June 2015, will be addressed at later points in this 
thesis. 
9
 This will be discussed further in the following chapter 
 4 
counterterrorism strategy.  After the Snowden leaks, by contrast polls showed a 
significant majority said secret domestic surveillance was acceptable.  (See Figure 1)
10
 
Much of the information needed to form a complete sense of the scope and 
methodology of the various programs exposed by Edward Snowden is still highly 
classified, and even those documents that have been leaked are difficult to interpret 
without the necessary context which remains classified and unobtainable.
11
  Additionally, 
successes achieved by the various intelligence and law enforcement agencies, particularly 
                                                 
10
 “Majority Views NSA Phone Tracking as Acceptable Anti-terror Tactic:  Public Says 
Investigate Terrorism, Even if it Intrudes on Privacy,” Pew Research Center, June 10, 2013, 
http://www.people-press.org/2013/06/10/majority-views-nsa-phone-tracking-as-acceptable-anti-terror-
tactic/ 
11
 All classified information contained within this thesis was obtained through open, public 
sources such as news media and published literature. 
F1:  Pew Research Center polling data 
comparing and contrasting the public's 
reaction to the NSA's surveillance 
programs under both President George W. 
Bush and President Barack Obama 
 5 
those that do not involve arrests on U.S. soil, are rarely publicized, and even when they 
are, the methods used to achieve these successes are almost never disclosed.  Doing so 
would almost certainly diminish the effectiveness of these programs, however much or 
little that may be, by alerting the various potential targets that they are subject to 
surveillance, and the United States government has absolutely no incentive to make the 
lives and missions of terrorists easier.   
Thus, if these programs are effective, as many past and present government 
officials, including President Barack Obama,
12
 have insisted, then not only did Snowden 
categorically break the law, but he also may well have endangered American lives.  
However, that does not necessarily mean that the programs are legal, ethically sound, or 
in general keeping with the principles on which the United States was founded and 
intended to operate.  In fact, on the face of it, much of what Snowden released seems to 
violate at least the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which 
states:   
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.
13
   
 
The National Security Agency acknowledged that it has collected massive amounts of 
metadata from American citizens and other U.S. persons without a targeted methodology; 
                                                 
12
 Ellen Nakashima, “Congressional Act on NSA is a Milestone in the Post-9/11 World,” 
Washington Post, June 2, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/congressional-
action-on-nsa-is-a-milestone-in-the-post-911-world/2015/06/02/f46330a2-0944-11e5-95fd-
d580f1c5d44e_story.html 
13
 “Bill of Rights.”  U.S. Archives.  Accessed April 14, 2015.  
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights_transcript.html 
 6 
there are no descriptions of “the place to be searched, and the…things to be seized” that 
specifically apply to the investigation of a known criminal act.
14
 
Edward Snowden’s leaks were, according to him, intended to spark debate and 
external examination of the NSA’s operations.  He alleged that some of the activities the 
NSA was undertaking were illegal due to their intrusive nature, but that despite that 
invasiveness, programs were ineffective against terrorists, albeit highly effective at 
spying on American citizens.  Snowden, through his own words and via the reporting of 
Greenwald, Poitras, et al, proclaimed that there should be investigations into the NSA’s 
activities and punishment for those involved in what he proclaimed to be illegal, 
ineffective, and anti-American programs.
15
  Despite Snowden’s rhetoric and certainty, 
there are five possible scenarios when examining the future of these programs:  
 The programs are entirely legal, and are an effective tool for counterterrorism, 
counterintelligence, and foreign affairs; 
 The programs are entirely legal, but are an ineffective tool, or at least are not 
effective enough to justify their expense; 
 The programs are illegal, but are an effective tool for counterterrorism, 
counterintelligence, and foreign affairs; 
 The programs are illegal, and are either ineffective or overly costly for their 
effectiveness; and 
 The legality of the programs is questionable, as is the effectiveness, but there is 
widespread debate and disagreement over each. 
                                                 
14
 John Darby, “SIGINT and the National Security Agency” (presentation, MSU DSS Intelligence, 
Counterintelligence, and Covert Action class, Vienna, VA, February 25, 2015); Hayden, in discussion with 
the author, September 21, 2015; Lee Ferran, “Ex-NSA Chief:  ‘We Kill People Based on Metadata,’” ABC 
News, May 12, 2014, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2014/05/ex-nsa-chief-we-kill-people-based-
on-metadata/; and Barton Gellman and Matt Delong, “The NSA’s Three Types of Cable Interception 
Programs,” last accessed April 26, 2015, http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/the-nsas-three-
types-of-cable-interception-programs/553/#document/p7/a129998 
15
 Citizenfour. HBO Films. 2014. Viewed via HBOGO 
 7 
In four out of these five scenarios, policy makers would seem to have extremely easy 
decisions to make.  If it is ineffective, why continue a program, regardless of legality?  If 
it is legal and effective, why discontinue?  And in general, if it is illegal, it is not worth 
doing, regardless of effectiveness, because the consequences of getting caught are too 
grave.
16
  Additionally, people and organizations that operate in an ethical manner rarely 
commit willful violations of the law. 
 The issue with the programs revealed in 2013 by Edward Snowden is that they 
fall into the fifth and final scenario.  Many, including Federal Judges Gerard E. Lynch
17
 
and Richard Leon,
18
 as well as the legal counsel for Yahoo!, have stated that the 
untargeted collection of metadata by the United States government is illegal for a variety 
of reasons that will be addressed below.
19
  Numerous others, including even Alan 
Dershowitz,
20
 a noted Fourth Amendment protectionist and strict constructionist, and 
libertarian Federal Judge Richard Posner,
21
 have said that the government is not 
                                                 
16
 James Bamford, The Shadow Factory:  The Ultra-Secret NSA from 9/11 to the Eavesdropping 
on America (New York, NY:  Doubleday, 2008), 108.  General Hayden, speaking to the author, stated that, 
prior to 9/11, the NSA “played a bit back from the line so as not to get close to anything that got the 
agency’s fingers burned in the Church-Pike era,” referring to the Senate and House committees formed in 
the mid-1970s to investigate wrongdoing and malfeasance in the intelligence community. 
17
 Ariane de Vogue, “Court Rules NSA Program Illegal,” CNN, last updated May 7, 2015, 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/07/politics/nsa-telephone-metadata-illegal-court/; and David Fidler, “While 
Ruling NSA Program Illegal, Appeals Court Suggests Path Forward,” Defense One, May 11, 2015, 
http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2015/05/while-ruling-nsa-program-illegal-appeals-court-suggests-
path-forward/112435/ 
18
 Zach Warren, “Judge Rules NSA Collection ‘Almost Certainly’ Violates Constitution,” Inside 
Counsel, December 17, 2013, http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/12/17/judge-rules-nsa-collection-
almost-certainly-violat 
19
 Ron Bell, “Shedding Light on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC):  Court 
Findings from Our 2007-2008 Case,” Tumblr.com, September 11, 2014, 
http://yahoopolicy.tumblr.com/post/97238899258/shedding-light-on-the-foreign-intelligence.  Bell is 
General Counsel to Yahoo! 
20
 Alan Dershowitz, interview by Piers Morgan, Piers Morgan Live, CNN, June 6, 2013.  View at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0BhhB6vuhqg 
21
 Grant Gross, “Judge:  Give NSA Unlimited Access to Digital Data,” PC World,  December 4, 
2014, http://www.pcworld.com/article/2855776/judge-give-nsa-unlimited-access-to-digital-data.html 
 8 
overstepping its bounds.  Examining the relevant statutory and constitutional issues 
involved will make up a significant portion of this thesis, as will the question of efficacy. 
 This thesis originated from a research project conducted by the author in a 
Missouri State University class entitled “Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Covert 
Action;” portions of the original product are featured throughout.  Extensive research has 
been undertaken, including interviewing General Michael Hayden, as well as 
examination of documents declassified by the United States government, news articles, 
court cases, and a variety of other media.  Included within this thesis are reproductions of 
and references to classified information leaked by Edward Snowden in 2013.
22
  
Additionally, it is abundantly clear to any but the most zealous anti-government activist 
that the vast, overwhelming majority of people who work at the National Security 
Agency and its partners in the intelligence community (IC) are patriotic Americans who 
do their best every day to respect and uphold the rights of their fellow citizens. 
 That said, classified NSA documents have been released and the programs 
revealed; they cannot simply be ignored.  Considering the legal framework and 
justification upon which the programs Edward Snowden revealed were based, it seems 
highly likely that they were conducted outside the boundaries of the law, in particular the 
United States Constitution. (See Appendix B) Furthermore, the use of these programs, in 
violation of legal norms, is thus likely to have a chilling effect on freedom of speech and 
expression for a number of different groups and potentially lead down a “slippery slope” 
wherein the intelligence community takes every excuse to “bulk up the collection” in the 
name of safety and security, while rights quietly but surely are stripped away. 
                                                 
22
 It should be noted that despite the use of these documents, the revelation of which was 
undoubtedly a violation of U.S. federal law, the author does not support Mr. Snowden’s unilateral decision 
to release them, and in fact believes that Mr. Snowden should stand trial for having done so.   
 9 
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
 
Examining the origins of an issue provides more important context and helps one 
to understand its current status and relevance.  This is particularly true in situations such 
as the NSA’s domestic intelligence operations, as they have elements of the past 
repeating itself.  Knowing about the NSA’s origins, the legal strictures within which the 
intelligence community must operate when taking action within the borders of the United 
States, the manner in which the programs under discussion herein were revealed, and 
even why they those revelations were made make it far easier to judge the current 
situation and come to realistic, well-informed conclusions. 
 
National Security Agency 
While the Central Intelligence Agency has traditionally been the primary target of 
investigative journalists looking for the next big scoop on the intelligence community and 
its perceived foibles, the National Security Agency has toiled tirelessly in relative secrecy 
and anonymity.  Those who paid attention to the intelligence community or national 
security were always aware of the NSA and may have even had some knowledge of its 
work, but the agency itself preferred to work in the high security confines of Fort Meade.  
Few people in the general public were aware of this massive, yet hidden, agency which 
employs more people and consumes more electrical power than any other single entity in 
the State of Maryland.
23
  In fact, prior to the Church Committee’s October 29th, 1975 
hearing, “representatives of the NSA [had] never appeared before the Senate in a public 
                                                 
23
 Mark L. Barnett, “National Security Agency/Central Security Service” (unclassified 
presentation to the Greater Baltimore Committee, April 26, 2011) 
 10 
hearing”24 since the agency’s inception in 1952.  Now the NSA has its own website, 
Twitter feed, and two Facebook pages.
25
   
Even the agency’s scandals lacked the sexiness of the CIA’s; contrary to the 1998 
blockbuster film Enemy of the State, the NSA does not, in fact, take part in assassinations 
of congressmen and mob lawyers.  However, at different points in its history, the NSA 
has come under fire from its oversight committees in Congress, which have alleged 
various improprieties and illegalities.  These scandals included monitoring phone calls by 
American citizens who were opposed to the Vietnam War—a revelation that helped lead 
to the passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
26—and the 
warrantless “eavesdrop[ping] on American phone calls and emails” ordered by President 
George W. Bush in the wake of the September 11
th
, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York 
City and the Pentagon, and later exposed in 2005 by the New York Times.
27
  Overall, 
however, as often happens in cases involving the intelligence community, many in 
Congress have appeared to, at least publicly, offer unqualified support for the operations 
of the agencies, as Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), at the time the Chairwoman of the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
28
 did in the weeks and months following when 
                                                 
24
 “Intelligence Activities—National Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights” (testimony 
at U.S. Senate Select Committee to  Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
Activities, Washington, D.C., October 29, 1975).  See the Chairman’s opening remarks. 
25
 www.nsa.gov, #NSAGov, and both an English and Spanish page on Facebook. 
26
 Ed Pilkington, “Declassified NSA Files Show Agency Spied on Muhammad Ali and MLK,” 
The Guardian, September 26, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/26/nsa-surveillance-anti-
vietnam-muhammad-ali-mlk.  Ironically, the NSA was also tapping the phone of Senator Frank Church, 
who led the aforementioned probe into the intelligence community in the years immediately following the 
Nixon presidency. 
27
 James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, “Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,” New York 
Times, December 16, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2& 
28
 “Members:  113th Congress (2013-2014),” U.S. Senate, accessed April 26, 2015, 
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/members113thcongress.html 
 11 
Edward Snowden’s leaks began to appear in The Guardian and Washington Post 
newspapers, among others.
29
 
Legally questionable activities by the NSA began before it even was the NSA.  
One of the agency’s predecessors, the United States Navy’s communications intelligence 
section, “began intercepting the international telephone calls and international cable 
traffic of Jewish agents in the United States” in 1946, a result of “Operation Gold.”30  
Operation Gold was a U.S. Navy Intelligence operation to intercept cable transmissions 
crossing the Atlantic Ocean.
31
 
Even the way in which the National Security Agency came into being is 
somewhat legally dubious.   
[O]n October 24
th
, 1952, [President Harry] Truman issued a highly secret order 
scrapping [the Armed Forces Security Agency] and creating in its place a new 
agency to be largely hidden from Congress, the public, and the world.  Early on 
the morning of November 4, as Truman was leaving a voting booth in 
Independence, Missouri, the National Security Agency came to life.
32
 
 
That high level of secrecy was par for the course for the NSA’s predecessors, such as the 
tiny Signal Intelligence Service, the employees of which were warned that “[t]he State 
Department…was never to know of its existence.”33 
                                                 
29
 Dianne Feinstein and Mike Rogers, interview by George Stephanopoulos, This Week, ABC, 
June 9, 2013.  See also Chairwoman Feinstein’s opening statement at a Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence hearing on March 12, 2013, where she was most effusive in her praise for DNI Clapper, NSA 
Director Alexander, and FBI Director Mueller. 
30
 Matthew M. Aid, The Secret Sentry:  The Untold History of the National Security Agency (New 
York, NY:  Bloomsbury Press, 2009), 10 
31
 Calder Walton, “How Zionist Extremism Became British Spies’ Biggest Enemy,” Foreign 
Policy, January 1, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/01/how-zionist-extremism-became-british-spies-
biggest-enemy/ 
32
 James Bamford, Body of Secrets:  Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency (New 
York, NY:  First Anchor Books, 2001), 31 
33
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Today, despite its website and Twitter feed, the NSA is still as secretive as any 
agency within the federal government can be in an age of instant news, immense 
computing power available at the public’s fingertips, and leakers such as Snowden and 
Chelsea (Bradley) Manning.  At one point, concerned that a new “eleven-story office 
building [located nearby] might be able to look into [Fort Meade], NSA leased the entire 
building before it was completed.”  In the early 1990s, a real estate photographer taking 
pictures near Fort Meade found himself “surrounded by NSA security vehicles” and 
questioned as to his intentions; he informed the officers that “he had never even heard of 
NSA.”34   
Despite being “the largest in terms of people and…in terms of budget” in the 
intelligence community,
35
 the agency spent much of its history trying to deny it even 
existed.  Even its internal nickname for the last seventy years has been a reference to the 
secrecy; in a play on its initialism, the NSA became “No Such Agency.”  The very 
number of employees is classified, and estimates of those working at Fort Meade range 
from 35,000 to 55,000.
36
 
Much has changed for the National Security Agency since September 11
th
, 2001.  
As James Bamford, a former Naval Intelligence seaman during the Vietnam War who 
became one of the leading experts and authors on the NSA, noted in his book The 
Shadow Factory, prior to 9/11 “the NSA was a little-noticed agency attempting to 
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downsize by a third and searching for a mission.”37  After the events of that day, the 
agency not only had a mission, but its chief, General Hayden, while trying to respect how 
“sensitive the entire culture behind…[the NSA] is to the Fourth Amendment,” was 
willing to do almost anything he considered necessary to prevent a repeat of that 
devastating terrorist attack.
38
 
 
Historical Violations of Americans’ Privacy Rights and Attempts to Limit Domestic 
Intelligence Collection 
Statutory law and executive regulation, along with the Constitution, limit 
domestic intelligence collection.  This includes the 1981 Executive Order (E.O.) 12333 
and its successors and the National Security Act of 1947, signed into law by President 
Truman, which expressly prohibited the newly created Central Intelligence Agency from 
having “police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions.”39  
E.O. 12333 established “lanes in the road” for the various intelligence agencies, 
demarcating exactly what functions each intelligence agency could undertake, and both 
conveying authority and explicitly denying it, particularly in the realm of domestic 
surveillance.  It specifically assigned domestic intelligence duties, especially counter-
espionage and counterterrorism efforts within the United States, to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI).  The CIA and the majority of the other intelligence agencies, such as 
those within the Department of Defense, were prohibited from engaging in domestic 
                                                 
37
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collection and surveillance, with limited exceptions for the purpose of “foreign 
intelligence” involving agents of “foreign powers.”40 (See Appendix C)  Typically, even 
those cases have been under the purview of the FBI, with assistance from or cooperation 
with the foreign-focused intelligence agencies.  The original limitations in the National 
Security Act were intended to prevent the American intelligence services from becoming 
domestic secret police like those in the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany, and the executive 
order was a reaction to past offenses by federal law enforcement and the intelligence 
community that came to light in the early 1970s. 
E.O. 12333 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 were 
specifically the result of the findings of the Church and Pike Committees in the Senate 
and House of Representatives, respectively, and the executive branch’s Rockefeller 
Commission, named for the Vice-President who led it.  Many of the issues that the 
commissions confronted were similar to those that are in the news today.  These 
investigative groups discovered widespread violations of Americans’ privacy, including 
investigations into civil rights leaders and protesters who had committed no crimes, and 
various other misdeeds by the FBI and other intelligence agencies, including the NSA.
41
  
Preventing further abuses was foremost in the minds of the members of the investigative 
committees. 
The NSA is one of the agencies specifically proscribed from conducting 
intelligence collection on so-called “U.S. persons.”  E.O. 12333 defined the term as 
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a United States citizen, an alien known by the intelligence agency concerned to be 
a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed 
of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens, or a corporation 
incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled 
by a foreign government or governments.
42
 
 
22 U.S. Code §6010 states much the same: “‘United States person’ means any United  
States citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence in the United States, and any 
corporation, partnership, or other organization organized under the laws of the United 
States.”43  Exceptions are made for situations “when significant foreign intelligence is 
sought.”  Foreign intelligence is defined by E.O. 12333 as “information relating to the 
capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons, but not 
including counterintelligence except for information on international terrorist 
activities.”44  Any other domestic surveillance (i.e. for law enforcement purposes) 
requires a warrant issued by a regular court. 
 After the Church and Pike hearings in the mid-1970s, Congress passed the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, becoming the main legislative 
barrier to unchecked IC actions within the United States.  FISA established requirements 
for pursuing warrants against Americans for the purpose of intelligence collection.  This 
includes the requirement that the targeted U.S. person be the subject of an investigation 
as an agent of a foreign power or of an international terrorism inquiry.  These warrant 
applications are made to a special court, known as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, or FISC.  It is also commonly known as the FISA Court.  The eleven judges who 
                                                 
42
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sit on the FISC are Federal District Court jurists selected by the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, and they serve for seven year staggered terms.  FISA was also the first 
time that Congress had defined terrorists as being the subject of foreign intelligence, 
setting the stage for the post-9/11 increase in signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection 
related to terrorism.
45
   
In 2005 New York Times reporters James Risen and Eric Lichtblau broke the news 
that the National Security Agency, under the auspices of a 2002 order by President 
George W. Bush, had begun a system of warrantless, targeted surveillance of “hundreds, 
perhaps thousands, of people inside the United States… in an effort to track possible 
‘dirty numbers’ linked to Al Qaeda.”46  According to Matthew Aid, who has written 
extensively on the U.S. intelligence community, this program became known as the 
Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) and was running as part of an overarching 
counterterrorism SIGINT program codenamed STELLARWIND,
47
 “which sifts through 
vast amounts of electronic data secretly provided by America’s largest 
telecommunications companies and Internet service providers, looking for signs of 
terrorist activity at home and abroad.”48 STELLARWIND involved the collection of bulk 
metadata, similar to programs revealed by Edward Snowden, but in this case the targets 
eventually specifically included U.S. persons, despite the lack of a warrant from the FISA 
                                                 
45
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Court or any other federal magistrate.
49
  From its origins, President Bush granted 
approval for the NSA, through STELLARWIND and TSP, to surveil Americans, letting 
this foreign-focused agency wiretap U.S. persons’ international phone calls and collecting 
bulk telephone and email metadata without a warrant.
50
  This was in direct violation of 
the Fourth Amendment and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which at the time 
did not include the provisions authorizing similar warrantless collection now found in 
Section 702 of that law, which were added in the 2008 amendments to that law and will 
be discussed in later chapters of this thesis.  This was also in spite of NSA having 
previously “stated that FISA has in no way hampered its other SIGINT collection 
operations.”51 
 President Bush’s originally authorized the NSA to surveil only calls that included 
at least one party to the call that was foreign, or calls specifically about terrorism, but 
according to the New York Times a report by several Inspectors General shows that the 
NSA went beyond that mandate and began gathering metadata on purely domestic calls.  
After being confronted by senior members of the Justice Department, including Attorney 
General John Ashcroft, about inconsistencies between what was authorized on paper and 
what types of surveillance was actually being conducted, the president “retroactively” 
authorized the full scope of what NSA was doing.
52
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Just a year before TSP began in 2002, then NSA Director Hayden, serving at the 
time as NSA director, and his CIA counterpart, George Tenet, had testified before the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) that neither of their 
agencies monitored the communications of Americans, with General Hayden going so far 
as to call it an “urban myth,” and “assured the committee that NSA would assiduously 
abide by the legal strictures on such activities as contained in [the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978].”53  
Even though these programs may have been legally questionable, a Justice 
Department lawyer, John Yoo, and White House counsel Alberto Gonzales—who later 
became Attorney General of the United States—wrote legal briefs justifying at least TSP.  
However, the access to information on these classified briefs was tightly controlled, and 
“[a]t the top of the list of people who were not permitted to see the Gonzales and Yoo 
legal briefs were the lawyers in NSA’s Office of General Counsel responsible for 
ensuring that the eavesdropping programs conformed with the law.”54  Excluded from the 
process were attorneys from the Justice Department’s Civil and Criminal Divisions, the 
Inspector General for the National Security Agency, or the Deputy Attorney General, any 
or all of whom would ordinarily be involved in vetting programs that were in any way 
legally questionable to make sure they complied with and conformed to the law.  As 
Matthew Aid pointed out, the only people who were allowed access were those who 
“were deemed to be ‘loyal’ by [Vice President Dick] Cheney’s office, and as such, 
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unlikely to question the programs’ legality.”55  This severe control over the legal briefs 
meant that there was virtually no one “in the know” who could, or at least would, take a 
critical look and attempt to determine whether the powers of the Presidency had been 
exceeded, much less whether there was a fundamental violation of the Constitution.   
Eventually, the central arguments of the Yoo and Gonzales briefs were made 
public; they posited that, during a time of war, there was in fact no limit to the President’s 
power.
56
  The George W. Bush Administration ignored two centuries of legal precedent, 
not to mention the fact that the country was not in fact at war; that requires a declaration 
by Congress, as laid out in Article II, Section 8 of the Constitution, which states this is 
the exclusive power of the Congress.
57
  Legality aside, General Hayden maintains that the 
program was valuable and important intelligence was gained that was used to help 
prevent terrorist attacks.
58
 
In 2004, then-Deputy Attorney General James Comey, who was acting in place of 
a hospitalized and extremely ill John Ashcroft, refused to recertify the STELLARWIND 
programs as lawful.  An attempt by Gonzales to go around Comey by visiting Ashcroft in 
the hospital had the same result, and both Comey and Ashcroft cited work by Assistant 
Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel Jack Goldsmith in their refusals.  
Goldsmith argued that Yoo’s legal rationale for the warrantless collection program was 
far too broad and noticed the disparity between what was authorized and what was taking 
place.
59
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Further reservations about the program were eventually voiced by Senator John 
D. Rockefeller IV (D-WV), a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court judge, and several 
members of the IC itself.
60
  According to Charlie Savage of the New York Times, “a threat 
of mass resignation by top [Justice] department officials” was what eventually prompted 
President Bush “to accept curbs on the program.”61 
All of this took place in a world where the attitude of the NSA, expressed to 
James Bamford by an intercept operator from the agency, was that “[b]asically all rules 
were thrown out the window, and they would use any excuse to justify a waiver to spy on 
Americans.”  This included American journalists, Red Cross workers, and businesspeople 
working in the Middle East, people who should have been protected by FISA, E.O. 
12333, and most importantly the United States Constitution.
62
  Although the executive 
order grants authority to the Attorney General to issue waivers to conduct electronic 
surveillance of U.S. persons if the investigation is for non-law enforcement purposes, it 
does require that there be “probable cause to believe that the technique is directed against 
a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”63  Because the NSA was spying on 
American citizens who could only be tried in civilian courts—with the exception of 
members of the uniformed military—any such investigation would have to be for law 
enforcement purposes. 
The same general controversy is still active at the time of the writing of this thesis 
as the public, courts, the executive branch and Congress argue over the rights of citizens 
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and the responsibilities of government.  Many of the programs revealed by Edward 
Snowden are direct successors to STELLARWIND, and PRISM was originally a part of 
the President’s Surveillance Program.64 
 
Edward Snowden Leaks 
 On June 5
th, 2013, London’s The Guardian published an article that declared that 
the “National Security Agency is currently collecting the telephone records of millions of 
US customers of Verizon, one of America’s largest telecoms providers.”65  Over the next 
several months, led by Glenn Greenwald, Ewen MacAskill, Barton Gellman, and 
numerous other journalists, The Guardian, the Washington Post, the New York Times, 
and several European news organizations such as Der Spiegel released hundreds of 
articles detailing NSA programs that collected, analyzed, and searched internet, phone, 
and text data from all over the world.  Edward Snowden passed documents and 
information to reporters either via encrypted e-mails or USB detachable hard drives in 
Hong Kong.
66
 
 Much of what NSA collected is known as “metadata,” which is defined as 
“information wireless carriers collect about where, when and to whom customers make 
phone calls… [M]etadata can contain phone numbers, the time and duration of calls and 
the location of the caller and the recipient… It can include which cellular towers were 
                                                 
64
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used to transmit the call and what kind of phone was being used.”67  As one journalist put 
it, metadata is “data about data.”68  Additionally, as will be seen in the following chapter, 
some of the these programs were picking up more than just the bare metadata and were, 
in fact, collecting entire internet-based phone calls, Skype sessions, and emails. 
 Snowden approached first Greenwald in December 2012, then eventually Laura 
Poitras, due to their noted opposition to American intelligence efforts in the internet era.
69
  
Snowden had written to Poitras after Greenwald failed to respond to him in a timely 
manner, telling her that he had access to, and intended to leak, “some extremely secret 
and incriminating documents about the US government spying on its own citizens and on 
the rest of the world…and specifically requested that she work with [Greenwald] on 
releasing and reporting on them.”70  He went on to explain his reasoning for the leaks: 
We [referring to Poitras and himself] can guarantee for all people equal protection 
against unreasonable search through universal laws… [W]e must enforce a 
principle whereby the only way the powerful may enjoy privacy is when it is the 
same kind shared by the ordinary:  one enforced by the laws of nature, rather than 
the policies of man.
71
 
 
This showed clearly what Snowden’s motives and intentions were:  he wanted first to 
“out” the intelligence community for doing something he considered to be wrong, 
although not necessarily illegal, and he wanted to enforce his own set of moral ideals on 
the IC’s collection methods and programs.  In Greenwald and Poitras, Snowden found 
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two people who felt much the same as he, with strong anti-government feelings, 
particularly as they applied to intelligence. 
 Within weeks of the leaks becoming public, the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) 
leveled criminal charges against Snowden.  The charging document, filed in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on June 14
th
, 2013, alleges that 
Snowden, by copying classified files and releasing them to Poitras, Greenwald, and 
others, violated 18 U.S.C. §641 (Theft of Government Property), §793(d) (Unauthorized 
Communication of National Defense Information), and §798(a)(3) (Willful Unauthorized 
Communication of Classified Communications Intelligence Information to an 
Unauthorized Person).
72
  Despite his repeated assertions to Poitras and Greenwald that he 
was prepared to face trial, and indeed wanted to have his day in court,
73
 as of this writing 
Edward Snowden had not returned to the United States and is residing in Russia.  
Snowden claims that he originally intended to flee to Latin America, and never intended 
to go to Russia.
74
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PROGRAMS OF NOTE 
 
 Rather than focusing on known targets with articulable terrorist connections, the 
National Security Agency has adopted several programs that mine data from a wide range 
of non-specific targets.  Because of the top secret nature of the programs, it is not 
possible for this thesis to determine whether they are truly successful, but it is worth 
noting the absence of any major terrorist activities on United States soil or against major 
American targets in the nearly fifteen years since the World Trade Center attacks.  This is 
not necessarily proof of triumph, as proving a negative is impossible, but considering 
what is known about how capable some terrorist organizations are, and their destructive 
goals, it is hard to imagine that they have not made numerous attempts to strike at the 
American homeland.  The fact that many of the publicized attempts made have been 
simple
75
 or “amateurish” and easily foiled76 seems to speak to a more anxious, or even 
desperate, opponent whose attempts to strike at the United States have been thwarted at 
every turn. 
 Even assuming the programs are successful, that does not mean they are legal, 
moral, or ethical.  However, it would also be foolish to accept on faith that reporters like 
Greenwald and filmmakers like Poitras, not to mention leakers of classified documents 
like Edward Snowden, are right in saying that these untargeted, mass-data programs are 
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illegal.  Each program is unique, has its own constitutional questions, and must be 
evaluated individually before broader conclusions are possible. 
 Examining classified programs while only having access to limited information 
and documents is a significant challenge, and presenting a full and impartial summary of 
them when the documents that are available were selectively released by individuals with 
an agenda is even more difficult.  Because of this, great care has been exercised in 
attempting to locate as accurate and unbiased information as possible, through personal 
examination of the documents that were leaked by Edward Snowden, learned opinions 
from experts and journalists who have spent their entire careers covering the national 
security and intelligence fields, and, of course, the statutes that led to these programs.  
While the rest of this thesis includes inferences and assumptions by necessity, this section 
contains as few as possible. 
  
PRISM   
The computer program called PRISM, disclosed early in the leaked articles by 
both Washington Post and The Guardian journalists, is far and away the best known and 
most debated of the programs revealed by Edward Snowden in 2013.
77
  PRISM has 
become synonymous with all programs conducted under the auspices of section 702 of 
the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, and will be used in that manner hereafter.
78
  
Warrants were issued under the auspices of this program to compel telecommunications 
companies to provide access to, among others:  stored communications (searches); instant 
                                                 
77
 Google News searches for PRISM NSA, MUSCULAR NSA, and BOUNDLESS INFORMANT 
NSA result in returns of “about” 31900, 5960, and 701, respectively 
78
 Benjamin Dreyfuss and Emily Dreyfuss, “What is the NSA’s PRISM Program?  (FAQ),” 
CNET, last updated June 7, 2013, http://www.cnet.com/news/what-is-the-nsas-prism-program-faq/ 
 26 
messaging/chat services; and even real-time information on chat and email log-ins or 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) usage.
79
  The DoJ sent PRISM program subpoenas to 
some of the most widely used and largest companies,
80
 not just in the telecommunications 
industry, but in the world.
81
   These companies were clearly labeled as “providers” for the 
program in NSA slides. (See Figure 2)
82
  Unlike programs such as MUSCULAR, detailed 
below, PRISM court orders gave companies the opportunity to fight the U.S. government, 
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case number 
 27 
including most notably Yahoo!, which “viewed [PRISM] as unconstitutional and 
overbroad surveillance,” resulting in the company having “challenged the U.S. 
Government’s authority”83 for several years.  Yahoo! only began complying with the 
order when the federal government threatened to impose fines of $250,000 per day on the 
company,
84
 an existential threat even to a corporation with a market capitalization of over 
$40 billion.
85
  Microsoft, the only company to precede Yahoo! in the program, complied 
fully with the government, including providing backdoor access to many applications.
86
 
(See Figure 3)
87
   
According to the Washington Post, PRISM allowed the NSA and FBI to tap 
“directly into the central servers of nine leading U.S. internet companies, extracting audio 
and video chats, photographs, e-mails, documents, and connection logs that enable 
analysts to track foreign targets.”88  PRISM retrieved mass amounts of data directly from 
these nine companies, rather than the small, specifically targeted amounts a warrant 
typically allows.  The court agreed to issue “four new orders…[which] defined massive 
data sets as ‘facilities,” provided that the government allowed the FISC to “certify 
periodically that the government had reasonable” minimization procedures in place.89 
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In order to initiate this access, the government would send a “directive” to an 
internet service provider (ISP) or content provider, approved by the Attorney General and 
Director of National Intelligence “compelling the providers assistance.”90  The Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), which studied the legality and 
effectiveness of the 702 programs, explained how PRISM collection worked in an 
invented scenario.   
The NSA learns that John Target, a non-U.S. person located outside the United 
States, uses the email address johntarget@usa-ISP.com to communicate with 
associates about his efforts to engage in international terrorism.  The NSA applies 
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its targeting procedures…and “tasks” johntarget@usa-ISP.com to Section 702 
acquisition for the purpose of acquiring information about John Target’s 
involvement in international terrorism.  The FBI would then contact USA-ISP 
Company (a company that has previously been sent a Section 702 directive) and 
instruct USA-ISP Company to provide to the government all communications to 
or from email address johntarget@usa-ISP.com.  The acquisition continues until 
the government “detasks” johntarget@usa-ISP.com.91 (Emphasis added) 
 
In addition to direct access to systems controlled by ISPs and content producers, 
the same authority from which PRISM was derived led to a program referred to as 
“upstream collection.”  This allowed the NSA to access the systems of the so-called 
“backbone” of the internet,92 the routers that actually move data throughout the 
interconnected virtual world.
93
  Rather than simply acquiring the “to or from” emails (or 
whichever other tasked selector was being used) of a particular target, it also allowed the 
NSA to collect communications about the target.  The PCLOB explained this type of 
collection as “one in which the tasked selector is referenced within the acquired Internet 
transaction, but the target is not necessarily a participant in the communication.”94 
Presumably, the NSA used these orders and direct access to the various 
companies in order to spy only on the internet activity of foreign terrorism suspects.  
However, with a direct line into a company’s system, and with access to “about” 
communications, it would be easy for the NSA to, either intentionally or accidentally, 
collect significant amounts of data from U.S. persons.  In a case where this is accidental, 
there are procedures in place to “minimize” the collected data.  Minimization is the 
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process by which intelligence or law enforcement agencies erase or censor information 
related to U.S. persons to protect their privacy.
95
   
Ordinarily if a U.S. intelligence agency captured an American’s emails or other 
communication, minimization procedures would require them to delete the data 
immediately upon discovery, and in fact the NSA has computer systems designed to 
catch this and erase the data before a human being even has access.  However, “wholly 
domestic communications could be acquired as much as 0.197% of the time” when NSA 
is picking up “about” communications due to flaws in IP filter programs.96  While this 
number seems to be quite small, the enormous amount of communications data collected 
means that “upstream collection could result in the government acquiring as many as tens 
of thousands of wholly domestic communications per year.”97  This data should be 
manually deleted, but if a captured email or “instant message” from a U.S. person, 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, contains clear evidence of a major felony or 
terrorist act, that information will be passed on to the FBI.
98
  Rather than being the “fruit 
of the poisonous tree” that would make not only that evidence but anything further 
derived from it or the knowledge of it inadmissible in court,
99
 this evidence would allow 
the FBI to open a full investigation.
100
  The U.S. government’s approach to incidental 
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collection does bear strong similarities to its policies on collateral damage in war; 
attempting to avoid it, and minimizing where avoidance is impossible. 
 
MUSCULAR 
The program known as “MUSCULAR” was identified in the Washington Post as 
“collect[ing] the internet ‘cloud’ traffic of Yahoo! and Google from an interception point 
on British territory,” with the ability to “store 10 gigabytes a day of processed traffic [in 
2009];” capacity may have as much as quadrupled at the present time.101  (See Figure 
4)
102
  According to published reports, this program was undertaken without the 
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F4:  NSA slide from presentation on Special Source Operations leaked by 
Edward Snowden.  It shows the storage capacity of the program and its 
cooperative nature with Britain's Government Communications Headquarters, 
the United Kingdom’s version of NSA 
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knowledge of the targeted companies, and Google claimed to be “‘outraged’ by the 
revelation.”103   
The cloud is an internet storage and software medium that allows a person to 
access data across multiple devices in non-static locations.  Companies like Yahoo! and 
Google store billions of images, emails, instant messages, and other communications 
items on the cloud at any given moment; every major internet company uses it in some 
manner, often without customers truly knowing or understanding what it is or how it 
works.  The cloud is now so ubiquitous that the server “farms” that support it were, as of 
2014, “responsible for more than 2% of the United States’ electricity usage.”104  Because 
of this widespread usage, the NSA directly accessing Yahoo!’s and Google’s cloud traffic 
gave it the opportunity to retrieve records numbering in the hundreds of millions.  
According to one document dated June 9
th
, 2013 that was leaked by Edward Snowden, in 
the preceding month MUSCULAR collected upwards of 180 million new records.
105
  
Like with PRISM, the law of large numbers applies:  if even a tiny percentage of the 
more than two billion records—assuming a relatively similar number of captured items 
each month—are from protected U.S. persons, there will be tens of thousands, if not 
millions of pieces of data that were captured in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  This 
is especially likely considering that “[m]any cloud providers engage in ‘georedundancy’ 
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efforts, which result in vast amounts of customer data sent to and from other datacenters 
to ensure that the data is always available.”106  Thus, data that is stored in the British Isles 
is not necessarily from outside the United States, even though both Yahoo! and Google 
have datacenters in America. 
Considering the amount of data that was mined in this operation, and the ubiquity 
of use of each of these companies’ products and services in the United States, Americans’ 
data was sure to have been captured.  This program was also undertaken without warrants 
and provided the NSA access, even if it does not intentionally take advantage, to a variety 
of information on United States citizens or other protected U.S. persons.   
The program itself is primarily operated by the United Kingdom’s Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), that country’s signals intelligence agency and 
the British equivalent of the NSA.  That distinction could be why General Keith 
Alexander, who was director of the NSA at the time of the Snowden leaks, said that NSA 
did not break into the two companies’ databases, saying “[i]t would be illegal for [NSA] 
to do that.”  However, E.O. 12333 bans the intelligence community from requesting or 
demanding any actions from any person or organization that, if conducted by a member 
of the IC, would be illegal.  Therefore, if NSA cannot legally gain access to Yahoo! or 
Google servers in this manner, it is also illegal to request that GCHQ provide assistance 
in doing so, or to request information derived from those servers. 
Former NSA General Counsel Rajesh De, in response to a query about 
MUSCULAR at a PCLOB public hearing in November of 2013, refused to confirm or 
deny the program’s existence, but did say the following:  “[A]s a general matter…any 
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collection NSA does would involve minimization procedures that are approved by the 
Attorney General, or if coverage were under FISA, by the FISC, that has rules in place to 
minimize the collection, retention and use of any incidentally collected U.S. person 
information.”107  In essence, De said that even if this program were exactly what 
journalists alleged it was, procedures were in place that would minimize the impact on 
U.S. persons. 
The NSA refuted the claim that Americans were subjected to any violation of 
their rights, and released a statement saying:  “NSA applies Attorney General-approved 
processes to protect the privacy of U.S. persons—minimizing the likelihood of their 
information in our targeting, collection, processing, exploitation, retention and 
dissemination.  NSA is a foreign intelligence agency…[only] focused on discovering and 
developing intelligence about valid foreign intelligence targets.”108  In all likelihood, this 
is a very factual statement; it is hard to imagine that the NSA—which employs tens of 
thousands of patriotic Americans, including military personnel who have often given up 
opportunities to earn greater pay to work to help secure the safety of the United States—
are going to work plotting how to violate peoples’ rights.  Searches of the information 
collected by MUSCULAR and the programs like it are limited by policy and regulation, 
and only a small number of people have access.
109
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BOUNDLESSINFORMANT   
All the information pulled into NSA databases by PRISM, MUSCULAR, and a  
myriad of other programs just results in massive banks of computer servers being filled; 
BOUNDLESSINFORMANT
110
 is the computer program that allows analysts to access, 
search, and pull specific files and information from the NSA’s server banks where 
collected data are stored.  Without BOUNDLESSINFORMANT, some of the other 
programs would be essentially worthless, like mining ore without having a smelter to 
extract the valuable portions.  The Guardian reported that Snowden-leaked documents 
show “it is designed to give NSA officials answers to questions like, ‘What type of 
coverage do we have on country X’ in ‘near real-time by asking the SIGINT 
infrastructure.’”111  For this reason BOUNDLESSINFORMANT may be the most 
valuable of the three programs examined herein as it allows the NSA to do actual 
analysis, not merely collection of intelligence. 
It is also the least known of the four programs examined herein, but it has the 
potential to be the most controversial.  Slides showing statistics like the acquisition of, as 
Greenwald and MacAskill wrote, “almost 3 billion pieces of intelligence from US 
computer networks over a 30-day period”112 [emphasis added] are sure to make excellent 
fodder for those looking to bash the National Security Agency, the administrations of 
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Presidents Bush and Obama, or the intelligence community as a whole. (See Figure 5)
113
  
Despite Greenwald and MacAskill’s inflammatory arguments in The Guardian, this is 
probably the most easily defended program as it simply a tool to search records, not 
capture them.  Therefore, while it could easily be used by a rogue employee illegally, 
there is no way to point to it as being inherently unlawful itself, whereas that argument 
can be (and has been) applied to the others.  It is only in concert with programs like 
PRISM and MUSCULAR that BOUNDLESSINFORMANT becomes suspect by 
association; taken alone, or with other NSA programs determined to be legal and ethical, 
it poses no great issue.   
However, when programs collect data that BOUNDLESSINFORMANT can 
search, and that data was obtained in a legally questionable manner, the search program 
contributes to the illegality by extension.  Using illegally collected data is also inherently 
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program) from various countries around the world, including the United States 
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a violation of the law, and BOUNDLESSINFORMANT makes it significantly easier to 
do exactly that.  While the program is a spectacular tool, it is also the most easily abused 
program discussed in this thesis.  Like all other NSA programs, there are limitations on 
the program including minimization and tasking requirements, but in rare cases NSA 
employees have abused surveillance authority according to a report by the agency’s 
inspector general.
114
  This tool simply makes it easier to do so. 
 
XKEYSCORE 
 XKEYSCORE is a computer application designed for one thing:  data mining, 
and lots of it.  As part of what the NSA refers to as “Digital Network Intelligence” (DNI), 
it has the capability to track, as one NSA presentation on the program stated, “nearly 
everything a typical user does on the internet.”  This includes email, website visits, and 
metadata. (See Figures 6 and 7)
115
  Searches via the program’s interface could easily 
target Americans or other U.S. persons without the need for a court order, simply because 
XKEYSCORE automatically scooped up internet data irrespective of the nationality or 
protected status of the originating user.
116
  According to reports, this data is collected 
from more than one hundred field sites in countries all over the world via fiber optic 
cables similar to the upstream collection of the aforementioned PRISM programs.  It is 
then stored for three to five days in the case of “full-take data” and four to six weeks for 
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metadata.
117
  Full-take data is everything that passes through the fiber optic cables, 
including emails, VoIP and Skype calls, internet searches, and much more.  HBO’s John 
Oliver, in a comic segment with Edward Snowden in an April 2015 episode of his show 
Last Week Tonight, discussed how this meant that very private, intimate images that a 
man may send someone would be picked up by this kind of program, stored for a period 
of time, and be searchable by, according to Snowden, anyone within NSA.
118
  Despite its 
wide reaching nature, according to The Intercept, XKEYSCORE is actually an extremely 
basic software program, running on linked Linux servers and accessible by standard web 
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browsers such as Mozilla’s Firefox.119 
 Similarly, The Intercept writers Morgan Marquis-Borie, Glenn Greenwald, and  
Micah Lee claim that  
XKEYSCORE also collects and processes Internet traffic from Americans, 
though NSA analysts are taught to avoid querying the system in ways that might 
result in spying on U.S. data… [However], [o]ne document The 
Intercept…[published] suggests that FISA warrants have authorized “full-take” 
collection of traffic from at least some U.S. web forums.
120
 
 
They also allege that a leaked 2013 NSA document entitled “VoIP Configuration and 
Forwarding Read Me” proves that the NSA is collecting voice calls, videos, and faxes 
numbering in the hundreds of thousands per day, although they do not specifically 
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contend that any of these are from protected U.S. persons.
121
  Greenwald claimed in a 
July 2013 article that exposed XKEYSCORE that much of this collection can be done in 
“real-time,” meaning that it takes place as the actual incident is occurring.122 
These assertions run contrary to the contentions by many, including Director of 
National Intelligence James Clapper, that foreign-oriented U.S. intelligence agencies do 
not routinely surveil “millions of Americans,”123 and those of former NSA Director 
General Keith Alexander that his agency neither surveils nor collects the emails, Google 
searches, phone calls or text messages of Americans,
124
 both in 2013.  In fact, when 
viewed with the knowledge of the PRISM and MUSCULAR programs, it is virtually 
impossible to conclude anything other than the fact that the National Security Agency has 
routinely conducted operations and used programs that allow for the capture of data, 
beyond simple metadata, transmitted and received by American citizens and other U.S. 
persons.  What DNI Clapper and General Alexander may have meant is that the NSA 
does not intentionally surveil or collect on Americans, or that this collection is minimized 
upon its discovery in the agency’s servers. 
 
Additional Thoughts 
 As Glenn Greenwald wrote in his book describing the process of meeting and 
revealing Edward Snowden, No Place to Hide, “it can be hard to generate serious concern 
about secret state surveillance:  invasion of privacy and abuse of power can be viewed as 
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abstractions, ones that are difficult to get people to care about viscerally…[t]he issue of 
surveillance is invariably complex.”125  This is clearly evident in the slides shown above; 
even the simplest of them requires some context to interpret their meaning as they pertain 
to the rights and privileges of U.S. persons versus those of the rest of the world.   
 With the proper context, details, and background, and with all of them put 
together, these four programs give a far clearer indication of what it is that the National 
Security Agency has been doing for the last decade in terms of domestic collection of 
signals intelligence.  This includes the use of sophisticated technology, direct lines into 
the infrastructure of some of the leading telecommunications companies in the United 
States and abroad, and storage of potentially trillions of records.  Considering the size of 
a new NSA data storage facility in Utah, with approximately 100,000 square feet—more 
than two acres, or about the size of a regulation soccer field, and about two-thirds the size 
of Facebook’s newest server center, which will “have servers installed in line with 
demand”126—of server rooms, and the fact that this facility is certainly not unique, it is 
impossible to come to any conclusion other than that NSA believes it will, and indeed 
intends to, retain the need to store immense amounts of raw data.
127
  In the “olden days” 
of the 1980s and 1990s, that much data would have been an overabundance, far too much 
raw information for the NSA to have much ability to sort and analyze due to the 
technological limitations of the time.   
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Now, with BOUNDLESSINFORMANT and XKEYSCORE, the NSA has the 
ability to rapidly sort and search much of that data.  Some observers, including television 
news personality Lawrence O’Donnell, have said that this massive collection makes them 
feel less worried about surveillance.  O’Donnell was quoted as saying “the fact that the 
government is collecting at such a gigantic, massive level means that it’s even harder for 
the government to find me.”128  There is still an element of truth in this, not least of which 
is that there are also so many potential targets that it is highly unlikely that the 
government is going to want to find you.  As Washington Post writer Ruth Marcus said, 
“my metadata almost certainly hasn’t been scrutinized,”129 but this attitude ignores the 
fact that the NSA has developed programs that allow it to find your metadata, and more, 
if someone in the agency decides that it is relevant. 
Edward Snowden claimed that he “could wiretap anyone, from you or your 
accountant, to a federal judge or even the president, if I had a personal email.”  This was 
vehemently denied by NSA Director Admiral Michael Rogers, saying that that was 
“impossible.”130  While it may well be accurate that Snowden himself did not have this 
capability, an examination of the various XKEYSCORE slides makes it abundantly clear 
that someone had this option.  Of course, it is also possible that Snowden did have this 
capability due to his position within the agency’s information technology support unit, 
but should not have.  More importantly, there does not appear to be any mechanism to 
prevent an analyst or other official who does, and should, have access to this program 
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from using it for unofficial reasons or without the expressed permission of a federal 
judge. 
 Regardless of the legality of these programs, which will be addressed at length in 
the following chapter, the safeguards in place would not prevent a rogue analyst from 
violating peoples’ rights.  The small number of people with access to these special 
programs has been presented as a reason not to worry about abuses,
131
 but it seems that 
an alternative way of examining this issue would be that the fewer people who know 
about something, the more likely they are to abuse it.  This was certainly the case in the 
early 2000s when the Office of the Vice President severely limited the number of people 
who had access to the illegal wiretapping program that was being run out of the NSA.  
Special access programs limit the number of people involved, but they also limit the 
number of people watching.  Obviously some programs need to be closely guarded, and 
anything involving SIGINT methods is likely to be included in that category, but simply 
having a small number of people with access is not a safeguard against abuse. 
 The best safeguard is likely the one that General Hayden mentioned:  the 
“sensitivity” to any issues involving the Fourth Amendment.132  No one wants to be “that 
guy” who screwed up, and, as mentioned, NSA workers are not likely to be people with 
an inherent desire or intent to harm other Americans.   
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LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
 
If nothing else is clear about the situation in which Edward Snowden has 
ensnarled himself, it is that he violated the law, his legally binding agreement upon being 
hired by Booz Allen Hamilton, and the confidentiality agreement he signed upon being 
assigned to work as a contractor with the National Security Agency.
133
  Unfortunately, 
Snowden’s apparent guilt or innocence do not make the legal questions surrounding the 
collection of metadata and other methods of surveilling domestic communications any 
simpler.  Rather, it may be the only thing about the NSA’s surveillance programs that 
provides more clarity than opacity.  Law is inherently a matter of interpretation, hence 
why the findings of a court are referred to as opinions; Constitutional law is even more 
so.  Facts are hard to ascertain; one person’s version of fact is another’s opinion, made all 
the more difficult by the apparent intransigence of most legal scholars who rarely change 
their minds on an issue regardless of what evidence is presented to them.  Interpretations 
do change, but it is often over the course of decades or generations, not in days or months 
or even years.  The law is, as the former Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court put it, a 
“product of the ages—wrapped in the opinion of the moment.”134 
The question of the legality of the collection of domestic metadata and other 
communications and signals intelligence is primarily one of Constitutional law, but the 
programs themselves derive their authorities from ordinary statutes.  The most important 
of these statutes are the aforementioned Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
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(and its various amendments), specifically Section 702 of the 2008 FISA Amendments 
Act, and Section 215 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001:  the USA 
PATRIOT Act. 
Section 702 authorized the PRISM program, which the government argues is 
entirely aimed outside the United States.
135
  It authorizes, “for a period of up to 1 year 
from the effective date of the authorization, the targeting of persons reasonably believed 
to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information.”136  
This portion of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 includes a subsection on limitations, 
which states: 
An acquisition authorized under subsection (a) — (1) may not intentionally target 
any person known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United States; 
(2) may not intentionally target a person reasonably believed to be located outside 
the United States if the purpose of such acquisition is to target a particular, known 
person reasonably believed to be in the United States; (3) may not intentionally 
target a United States person reasonably believed to be located outside the United 
States; (4) may not intentionally acquire any communications as to which the 
sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be 
located in the United States; and (5) shall be conducted in a manner consistent 
with the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
137
 
 
The clear intention of this part of the Act was to ensure that American citizens and other 
U.S. persons were not targeted by the intelligence community during its counterterrorism 
and counterintelligence searches.  Due to the specific prohibitions on targeting U.S. 
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persons, for actions under §702 “the government is not required to go before the court to 
obtain individual surveillance orders.”138 
 Section 215 provided the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a 
designee the ability to:  
make an application [to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court] for an order 
requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, 
documents, and other items) for an investigation to protect against international 
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of 
a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities 
protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.
139
 
 
The government interpreted this to include electronic records as “tangible things,”140 and 
thus the FISC authorized the wholesale gathering of all available metadata from 
companies such as Verizon.
141
  It would stand to reason that the government also 
requested orders for the production of similar “tangible things” from other service 
providers such as AT&T, Sprint, and the other major carriers, but none have been made 
public as of the writing of this thesis. 
Metadata is collected by each phone company for the purpose of billing 
customers.  Capturing the duration of calls, their origin, and destination allows companies 
to determine how much to bill for each call, or in the era of prepaid phone plans, how 
each call fits within the plan’s limits.  The same goes for text messaging, though rather 
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than duration, metadata instead reflects the number of texts sent and received.  Without 
this information, a phone company will lack the necessary means to successfully bill 
customers, and the collection of metadata has significant implications for marketing as 
well.   
It is questionable whether the U.S. Congress actually intended for the intelligence 
community to gain such unlimited access to this kind of data.  Rather, the standard has 
generally required that any data captured or targeted be “relevant” to an active 
investigation.
142
  The Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s (ODNI) response 
to the issue of potential Fourth Amendment violations was that the actual searches and 
seizures took place only after the metadata was collected; the original step of gathering 
that information was preliminary only, and did not trigger a Fourth Amendment 
question.
143
 
 
New Procedures under USA FREEDOM Act 
Currently, following the passage and implementation of the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet- 
Collection and Online Monitoring (USA FREEDOM) Act, the legal authority, as the IC 
read it at the very least, to collect metadata was allowed to lapse by Congress.  A six 
month “buffer” to allow the programs to wind down expired on November 29th, 2015.  
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From that date on, while phone companies are still required to maintain metadata files for 
a lengthy period of time, the U.S. government will no longer hold and control those files 
itself; rather, the IC or federal law enforcement “must now get a court order to ask 
telecommunications companies to enable monitoring of call records of specific people, or 
groups, for up to six months.”144  The vocal outrage from some Congressmen and 
Senators, along with civil libertarians on the conservative side of the political aisle and 
anti-surveillance liberals, led to the passage of the new law; Edward Snowden’s 
revelations had the rare effect of bringing together the far sides of the political spectrum.   
Representative Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI-5), the initial sponsor of the USA 
PATRIOT Act, expressed displeasure in the days following the Snowden leaks at how his 
bill was interpreted by the intelligence community, calling the 215 programs “dragnet 
collection of phone data with rubberstamp approval by a Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act court” and terming them “incredibly troubling.”145  Later, 
Sensenbrenner also sponsored the USA FREEDOM Act.
146
  Within two weeks of the 
Snowden leaks, Representatives Justin Amash (R-MI-3) and John Conyers, Jr. (D-MI-13) 
introduced a bill to limit “the federal government’s ability under the Patriot Act to collect 
information on Americans who are not connected to any ongoing investigation.”147  The 
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bill, which was unsuccessful and died in committee without ever having been voted upon, 
attracted fifty-two additional bi-partisan cosponsors.
148
 
Following Snowden’s leaks President Obama said that he would welcome a 
debate on the issue of mass surveillance in light of Snowden’s leaks, and DNI Clapper 
said that some of the ongoing discussion was valuable.
149
  Even the FISA Court weighed 
in on the controversy.  An opinion by Judge Dennis Saylor, released in September 2013, 
argued that releasing more FISC opinions “would contribute to an informed debate 
[and]…assure citizens of the integrity of this Court’s proceedings.”150   
The USA FREEDOM Act eventually accomplished some of the reforms that had 
been called for in the months following the Snowden leaks, and passed with 
overwhelming majorities in both the House of Representatives (338-88)
151
 and the Senate 
(67-32).
152
  Among those voting against the bill were Senators Rand Paul (R-KY) and 
Bernie Sanders (D-VT), both of whom felt that the USA FREEDOM Act remained too 
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invasive and that even with the new restrictions the NSA was violating the 
Constitution.
153
   
A great deal of improvement in the system has been made despite the objections 
of Senators Paul and Sanders.  The process to obtain materials from the various 
companies that hold data—such as telephone or internet service providers—is specific 
and detailed, requiring several steps to acquire metadata or other telecommunications 
information that are systematic and codified in the law. (See Figure 8)
154
   
The new law requires the NSA to notify the FBI that there is reasonable, 
articulable suspicion (RAS) “that the specific selection term to be used as a basis for the 
production is associated with a foreign power, or an agent of a foreign power, engaged in 
international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore.”  Representatives from the 
FBI then present a signed application to the Department of Justice, which files the 
application with the FISC.  If the FISC approves the application (affirming that there is 
RAS), the NSA Data Interface sends the selector(s) to be queried to the NSA Enterprise 
Architecture.  Selectors are validated, data is retrieved from metadata that “NSA already 
lawfully possesses,” and additionally sends the request to providers to query against their 
own records.  These results must also be validated and then stored in the NSA Enterprise 
Architecture before an analyst finally may query the Enterprise Architecture.  In an 
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emergency, the Attorney General may temporarily authorize a query pending an 
application to the FISC, which must be submitted within seven days.  
Beyond the new procedures for obtaining data from providers, other changes 
include new reporting requirements to the FISC, more opportunities for private 
companies to reveal to the public how many FISA orders they receive, and limits the 
number of “hops”155 that can be made to two.  Most importantly, it requires either the 
declassification of legally significant FISC cases or the production of an unclassified 
summary if declassification is not possible.  Additionally, the FISC must establish a panel 
of public advocates to represent the interests of the people in certain cases that involve 
significant legal questions.  These new procedures do slightly delay NSA analysts 
receiving the data for which they are searching, but it does significantly lower the 
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associated Constitutional concerns surrounding the NSA’s collection of data from the 
various providers.
156
  However, this does not entirely alleviate the Fourth Amendment 
issue due to the reduced reasonable, articulable suspicion constraint the NSA must 
follow, rather than probable cause as required by the Fourth Amendment. 
 
Fourth Amendment Questions 
U.S. citizens, and non-citizens on U.S. soil, are entitled to certain guarantees of 
protection against the government.  Foremost among these are the rights collectively 
organized in the “Bill of Rights,” those first ten amendments to the Constitution that spell 
out the liberties the founders believed most important.  In this case, there is one that in 
particular requires attention; the Fourth, which requires that any search and seizure be 
preceded by a warrant based on probable cause.  To fully articulate the arguments, a 
complete understanding of the Amendment itself is necessary.  Stemming from Britain’s 
1215 document the Magna Carta like many of the original ten amendments to the 
Constitution, the Fourth Amendment affirms the right to be free from unwarranted 
searches.  Technology today allows new kinds of searches and seizures, of a variety that 
the Founding Fathers could never have imagined.  Early in his book describing the 
process of receiving and publishing leaked documents from Edward Snowden, Glenn 
Greenwald remarks that, “[t]echnology has now enabled a type of ubiquitous surveillance 
that had previously been the province of only the most imaginative science fiction 
writers.”157 
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Simple and relatively uncomplicated, particularly in terms of the normally 
exceptionally complex U.S. Constitution, the Fourth Amendment states that to conduct a 
search or seizure, there must be a duly issued warrant, which is issued upon probable 
cause.  According to Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, however, the 
standard for his employees is rather lower.  The NSA uses the “reasonable suspicion” 
standard,
158
 presumably basing this on the rules laid out in Terry v. Ohio.  Terry was 
intended to allow police officers to make investigative stops based on “reasonable, 
articulable suspicion” that a crime had occurred, was occurring, or was about to occur, 
and conduct cursory pat downs for weapons, but not evidence of the crime.
159
  However, 
that standard applies when there is a crime believed to have occurred, be occurring, or be 
about to occur, not a “fishing expedition” where a line is simply thrown out into the water 
under the theory that somewhere, someone is, or might be, doing something wrong.  
Additionally, this standard was never intended to become a substitute for probable cause 
in application for a warrant, or even to be used as the basis for a warrantless search under 
one of the exceptions carved out by the Supreme Court.  In all criminal cases, searches 
for evidence of a crime or for a hidden person require probable cause to be expressly 
delineated, and in the case of a warrant application, that probable cause must actually 
explain exactly what the item, or items, to be searched for are, and where the officer 
anticipates they are located.   
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General Hayden argues that while this makes sense for criminal cases, the 
standard needs to be different for non-law enforcement intelligence operations.  As he put 
it, there should not be  
a blank check…for the intel guys… But traditionally, in American law, we’ve 
made that distinction… [T]hat’s why we try to [separate] information gathered for 
intelligence purposes, from information for law enforcement purposes.  There’s a 
membrane between the two… [I]t’s always easier…to get a FISA [warrant] for 
foreign intelligence purposes, than it would be for the [FBI] to get one for law 
enforcement purposes.  [This is because if the NSA] overreaches, [it’s] squeezing 
your privacy.  If the [Federal] Bureau [of Investigation] overreaches, they’re 
squeezing your privacy and threatening your liberty, because they can put you in 
jail.
160
 
 
 The federal government of the United States agrees, arguing that due to the grave 
threat of terrorism and the potential for massive casualty numbers, there needs to be a 
different system in place for the national security apparatus to operate.  However, a strict 
reading of the Constitution, as well as any number of court decisions on the Fourth 
Amendment or the right to privacy, argues otherwise.  While there are several 
“exceptions” to the warrant requirement that have been enumerated over the years by the 
Supreme Court, each of them requires some form of emergency or exigency.  Those 
exigencies result in a situation in which the evidence of the crime being investigated will 
disappear, be destroyed, or be unavailable for some reason, or an emergency involving 
risk to the life or safety of a person who is unable to immediately assist himself or 
herself.
161
  In rare circumstances, what has become known as the “substantial government 
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interest” test has been used to justify semi-intrusive seizures, but not searches.162  Few 
would argue that a police officer or federal agent who knows that a terrorist’s bomb, 
known (or even believed) to be set to explode imminently, is behind a locked door should 
stand back and await a warrant; this is no different from the situation of an armed 
hostage-taker holding a gun to someone’s head behind the same closed door.  Widespread 
and untargeted surveillance or data seizure fails to satisfy even the loosest definition of 
exigency.  Thus, the arguments and rationales for the types of programs being run by the 
National Security Agency have become that the standard must be lowered in the case of 
terrorism related issues.   
For the government’s seizure of metadata, the rationale in Michigan State Police 
v. Sitz makes a great deal of sense; the mere seizure of metadata does not cause any 
undue stress to the individuals whose data has been seized.  In fact, it is almost 
guaranteed that they will not know about the seizure due to the classified nature of the 
seizure.
163
 
 Another argument that General Hayden made was that the “third party doctrine,” 
which was established by Smith v. Maryland
164
 and United States v. Miller,
165
 allows the 
government to receive records about an individual or group that are held by a third party 
without a warrant and without violating the Fourth Amendment.  General Hayden 
explained that “[t]hose phone bills belong to Verizon,” after all.166  Because “[t]he laws 
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that govern online privacy are older than the World Wide Web” there are few protections 
for people using the internet and other modern technologies such as smart phones.
167
  
Most recently, in 2015, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the applicability of 
the third party doctrine as it applies to modern cellular phones and providers in United 
States v. Davis.
168
   
Even if the third party doctrine is accepted as applicable in this case, however, the 
federal government did go out of its way to get a warrant through the FISA Court, in 
effect admitting that there was a search or seizure taking place that required that warrant.  
Thus, while the third party doctrine is worth examining for future cases in which the 
phone companies turn over information willingly, in the specific case of the seizure of 
data and metadata here, it was involuntary; Verizon, and presumably other companies, 
received a court order from the FISC.  While not relating specifically to metadata, 
Yahoo! was ordered—and threatened when it did not comply—to turn over data it felt 
was not within the purview of the government to seize.   
The key, then, to evaluating this issue in the context of the Fourth Amendment is 
to remember that the search itself is not the proximate cause of injury; rather, the seizure 
is.  Though the warrants that are issued to search the data recovered are issued by a judge 
and are requesting access to specific records and files,
169
 they require a far lower standard 
than the Fourth Amendment specifies.  Even if that were ignored, it still does not permit 
or allow the seizure of the data that is to be later searched.  The court orders that made 
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that possible are demonstrably illegal for two reasons:  first, that they fail to particularly 
describe the items to be seized; and second, for their breadth, which places no limits on 
the “area” from which to seize data. 
Judge Richard Leon, sitting for the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia, wrote in his decision on Klayman v. Obama that “[t]he almost-Orwellian 
technology that enables the government to store and analyze the phone metadata of every 
telephone user in the United States is unlike anything that could have been conceived in 
1979”170 in declaring mass metadata seizures unconstitutional.171  This followed a 2014 
Supreme Court decision that disallowed searches of cell phones incident to arrest,
172
 
which Klayman, representing himself, argued was substantially similar to the actions of 
the NSA in PRISM and MUSCULAR, except that there was no prior arrest or criminal 
charge, nor even suspicion of criminality, facing the people who were having their 
records seized. 
Richard Posner, a federal judge sitting on the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit and one of the most prominent non-Supreme Court members of the Judicial 
Branch, disagrees in the strongest terms:  “I think privacy is actually overvalued,” he 
said.  “Much of what passes for the name of privacy is really just trying to conceal the 
disreputable parts of your conduct.  Privacy is mainly about trying to improve your social 
and business opportunities by concealing the sorts of bad activities that would cause other 
people not to want to deal with you.”173  Judge Posner is a giant in his field, and his 
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judicial opinions carry tremendous weight, but it is hard to understand where this 
particular sentiment—which is not based on a case in front of him, but simply his own 
personal beliefs and legal acumen—comes from.  He fails to explain how the desire to 
maintain privacy for the reasons he presents means that the protections of the 
Constitution should not apply.  Regardless, his judgment is important in that he is the 
most notable jurist on record with this opinion.  Beyond that, he is one of the preeminent 
legal minds in the United States, and has often expressed many libertarian-leaning 
opinions. 
 
Due Process—Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
It is difficult to even sue the United States government over the NSA’s tracking or 
information gathering.  Attorneys from the Solicitor General’s and U.S. Attorney’s 
offices routinely argue that plaintiffs lack standing to sue, saying that these parties have 
not suffered any harm,
174
 and it is nearly impossible to show evidence of direct harm, or 
even that an individual has been subjected to the NSA’s information intake, due to the 
classification of virtually information related to these matters.  Not only does the U.S. 
government argue this, but judges have agreed with it at the highest levels; the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in 2007
175
 and the Supreme Court in 2013 ruled that the ACLU 
and Amnesty International, respectively, lacked standing to sue as they had not incurred 
any injury, nor was such imminent.
176
  Of course, the plaintiffs may well have suffered 
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harm, or may be facing imminent harm, but are unable to provide or gain access to 
evidence that would prove that they have.  Despite the normal rules of evidence, or even 
just a simple Freedom of Information Act request, requiring that the government turn 
over documents related to the cases, the national security secrets argument allows it to do 
the exact opposite. 
Under this legal theory, only someone who has been charged with a crime would 
be able to challenge the constitutionality of a system that has wide ranging, sweeping 
coverage.  In the words of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Sonia Sotomayor, 
according to the government’s argument, “if there was a constitutional violation in the 
interception…no one could ever stop it until they were charged with a crime, 
essentially.”177  According to U.S. Solicitor General Donald B. Verilli, Jr., government 
having the authority to capture information (metadata, in this case) from each and every 
American provides neither imminent or actual harm, but simply a “speculative… 
connection between the grant of authority and a claim of injury.”178 
The problem that presents itself here, however, is that the government is 
effectively denying due process rights, guaranteed in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, by denying the opportunity to challenge the legality of these programs.  
Due process, which applies to both criminal cases and to the general activity of the 
government, is the only specific item mentioned twice in the Constitution,
179
 for good 
reason; it requires the government to “operate within the law…and provide fair 
procedures.”  A list of requirements for due process to be achieved derived from an 
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article by Judge Henry Friendly provides ten such and is still “highly influential.”  This 
includes “the right to know opposing evidence,” such as records that reflect the capture 
and possession of data material to the plaintiffs in both the ACLU and Amnesty 
International cases, or lack thereof.
180
 
Another of Judge Friendly’s requirements was an unbiased tribunal.  Being able 
to challenge warrants only long after the fact, or in the confines of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), fails to satisfy the requirement for what Associate 
Justice Robert Jackson referred to as “a neutral and detached magistrate.”181  The FISC 
employs judges who have not endured the standard rigorous process of Senatorial “advice 
and consent” that virtually all other federal judges and justices do prior to their 
appointment to this particular bench.
182
  Because so-called “FISA judges” are not 
considered to be “Article III” appointees, whose existence is supported and mandated by 
the eponymous portion of the Constitution of the United States, they are among the small 
handful of judges and justices serving in their positions within the federal government 
who are not appointed by the president dependent upon the advice and consent of the 
Senate.  The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, instead, appoints the members of the 
FISC for a period of not more than seven years.
183
  These judges are members of the 
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judiciary already and have previously been scrutinized,
184
 but unlike other judges who are 
“promoted” or assigned to new posts, where there is an opportunity to question the 
candidates on specific issues related to their work or their recent decisions, they are 
simply assigned in this case.  This results in judges who are not subject to the same 
scrutiny upon appointment and who are more likely to act as agents of the Chief Justice’s 
agenda rather than as impartial, “neutral and detached magistrates,” lest they suffer any 
recrimination for failing to follow the Chief Justice.   
This has resulted in a situation in which the FISA court judges rejected fewer than 
a dozen warrant requests over the first thirty-three years of their existence, just three one-
hundredths of a percent of the overall requests.
185
  Rather than the adversarial model that 
exists in other criminal courts, with no opposing attorneys or petitioners, the judges in the 
FISC appear in many ways to work with the federal government to obtain warrants, 
including informing requesting officers how to improve their petitions.
186
  This 
cooperative effort is anathema to the normal system of laws in the United States where a 
judge who rejects a warrant tells an officer why the standard was not met, not how to 
rewrite the application.   
Judges are by their very nature intended to be impartial arbiters of justice, taking 
no side but that of the law.  Appointing them to oversee just one small section of the 
statutory codes of the country, with what could only be a small number of applicants—if 
only due to the highly classified nature of the situations which would tend to precipitate a 
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FISA warrant request—puts them in the position of becoming too close to those 
petitioning them, removing objectivity. 
 
Governmental Necessity 
“Laws are silent when arms are raised…” Cicero told Pompey’s judges, “when he 
who waits will have to suffer an undeserved penalty before he can exact a merited 
punishment.”187  It is Cicero’s argument that is heard time and time again when the 
federal government of the United States defends its capture of Americans’ phone call and 
email data, or when it passes laws or internal regulations that lower the standard of 
evidence needed to obtain a warrant.  Government’s job is to provide protection from 
external, and occasionally internal, threats to the country, as codified in the Constitution 
of the United States.
188
  Preventing an “undeserved penalty,” in the case of the United 
States from the actions of terrorists, is the goal of both the military and the civilian 
leaders of the country and, thus, they cannot simply wait. 
Governmental necessity as a reason to do something is also codified in the 
Constitution through the “Necessary and Proper Clause” in Article II, which enumerates 
the responsibilities and roles of the legislature.  It states that Congress shall have the 
power “[t]o make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the 
                                                 
187
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government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.”189  While not 
removing the requirement that these laws be congruent with the rights the Constitution 
endows to the people, it does allow Congress a great deal of leeway.  If the federal 
government is required by the Constitution to defend and protect the people of the United 
States, then it would follow that Congress can enact whatever laws are “necessary and 
proper” to allow the President and the executive branch to do just so. 
 And so, how to determine which takes precedence:  the powers of the 
government; or the rights of the people?  There is no simple or easy answer, and it most 
likely comes down to being determined on a case by case basis.  In this case, the 
government’s need to protect the people against attack is paramount to the government, 
and with the agreement of the people that terrorism is a major, growing threat, maybe 
even the greatest threat the nation faces, there is wide leeway being given to the 
government. (See Figure 9)
190
  To some extent, if the people give their approval, tacit or 
overt, to a government program, that program should exist.  The issue is determining 
where the line between “acceptable because the people say so” and “unacceptable even 
with the peoples’ consent” should be defined.  Combining the government arguing 
necessity and the people howling for a solution has resulted in past tragedies, not the least 
of which being the internment of Japanese-Americans during the Second World War
191
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and the blacklisting of suspected communists during the Cold War.
192
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Miscellany  
The FISA courts’ lack of an accused who is capable of and allowed to mount a 
defense is prima facie evidence of a failure to meet the “case and controversy” 
requirement embodied in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, which states: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority…--to Controversies between two or more States;-- 
between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different 
States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of 
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
Citizens or Subjects.
193
  
 
Beginning with John Jay, the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, this section was 
interpreted to mean that only in cases wherein there was a genuine conflict between 
parties could there be a role for the federal judiciary.
194
  In fact, under Muskrat v. United 
States, it is quite possible that the entire matter is unconstitutional simply because 
Congress, via appropriations of funds, is the only entity paying for arguments before the 
courts in the case of these warrants, a scenario banned under this 1911 decision that has 
never been overturned.  The decision stated that if Congress is the only party paying, then 
there is no real controversy to be decided.
195
  It can thus be argued that any and all 
decisions by the FISC are invalid and the court lacks standing due to its prohibition on 
the presentation of evidence and argumentation by a defendant. 
The Ninth Amendment must not be forgotten either, stating that simply because it 
does not appear in the Constitution, something is not precluded from being a right of the 
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people.
196
  This amendment was used heavily in Justice Arthur Goldberg’s concurrence 
in the case of Griswold v. Connecticut, which established the right to privacy as an 
unenumerated right of the people.
197
  If people do indeed have the right to privacy that 
may well extend to situations such as these where the government has established a 
program which inherently invades the privacy of the citizenry, even if it does not do so in 
a manner which causes wholesale direct harm.  Since one of the main arguments that 
proponents of the NSA’s programs, including General Hayden and the DNI, have made is 
that there is no direct harm even if there is “incidental” or otherwise unintended 
collection, the fact that privacy may be invaded or limited does violate the unenumerated 
right laid out in Griswold.  It should also be noted that the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, which the United States signed in 1977 and ratified in 1992,
198
 
bans “arbitrary…interference with [any person’s] privacy, family, home or 
correspondence.”199  Indiscriminate collection of email or communications metadata 
would logically fall under the auspices of this treaty’s ban on arbitrary interference with 
correspondence. 
An additional concern for privacy advocates is the relationship between the NSA 
and federal law enforcement.  According to Reuters and the Washington Post, the NSA 
provides classified communications and signals intelligence to the Drug Enforcement 
                                                 
196
 “Bill of Rights.”  The Ninth Amendment covers what are known as “unenumerated rights.” 
197
 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
198
 “Treaties in Force:  A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States 
in Force on January 1, 2013,” United States Department of State, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/218912.pdf.  See page 399 for the timeline of the United 
States’ involvement in this convention.  The State Department did not release full reports for the years 2014 
or 2015, making this document the most recent complete list of United States treaty and convention 
obligation.  No changes have been made to the U.S. obligations under this convention. 
199
 “International Convention on Civil and Political Rights,” United Nations Human Rights Office 
of the High Commission, last accessed March 2, 2016, 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx 
 67 
Agency (DEA).  In August 2013, Reuters revealed that the DEA engages in what is 
called “parallel construction,” wherein agents conduct an investigation based on the 
classified information received from the intelligence community and then use what is 
learned during that investigation to, as one former DEA agent stated, “work it backwards 
to make it clean.”200  This could lead to an issue under the same “fruit of the poisonous 
tree” rule addressed in a previous chapter, as well violate a defendant’s right to receive all 
possible exculpatory evidence during discovery.  The Supreme Court has ruled that if a 
federal law enforcement agency used evidence derived from Section 702 it programs 
must be revealed during discovery and defense attorneys must be allowed to challenge its 
admissibility.
201
  However, the DEA’s use of parallel construction may have resulted in a 
situation where this did not occur, thus violating defendants’ rights under the Sixth 
Amendment.
202
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HOW EFFECTIVE IS DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE? 
 
“Your successes are unheralded—your failures are trumpeted,” President John F. 
Kennedy said to a gathering of Central Intelligence Agency workers in November of 
1961.
203
  That is the nature of the intelligence community, and the reason it is so difficult 
to evaluate the effectiveness of any particular program or group thereof.  There are 
reporters like Barton Gellman and James Bamford who have made their names and 
reputations on work about the IC, but by and large the wall of secrecy that surrounds the 
NSA, CIA, and other “three letter” agencies is challenging to penetrate.  To a great 
extent, the assertions of members of the IC, Congress, and the executive branch about the 
efficacy of the sixteen intelligence agencies must simply be relied upon to be accurate.
204
  
Due to situations in the past when members of the intelligence community and 
government in general have lied about, covered up, or otherwise ignored malfeasance, or 
even just made mistakes—a problem that any group so large will have to face at some 
point—many in America do not trust the U.S. government.  In general, the country’s trust 
in the government is at an all-time low among all generations. (See Figure 10)
205
 
This means that Americans, primarily through the work of investigative 
journalists, are taking a closer look at what is going on inside government and providing 
the citizenry a more complete look at not only what their government is doing, but how 
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they are doing it, why they are doing it, and even how well it is being done.  This has 
been aided by unprecedented leaks from the intelligence community and law enforcement 
over the last two decades, and in some cases unprecedented access to the IC, as in the 
 
example of James Bamford while writing his seminal book on the NSA, Body of Secrets 
in the latter years of Bill Clinton’s presidency.206  Decreasing trust in government has 
numerous causes, but when a person who is already concerned about the actions of 
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government is presented with information like what Snowden leaked, it is easy to 
understand how this could increase that unease. 
Still, the best estimates of the efficacy of the 702 and 215 programs are just that:  
estimates.  The need to keep collection methods secret has led to President Kennedy’s 
statement to the CIA becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy within the entire intelligence 
community. 
 Understanding how metadata is used offers a glimpse into why the intelligence 
community considers it to be an important and useful tool.  First, it is far easier to sort 
through and analyze than voice recordings which require a person to actually listen and 
determine if they are important; even if a computer program transcribes everything it will 
almost certainly not be entirely accurate due to accents, dialectic differences, and slang 
usage.  Thus, it “ultimately requires at least some human analysis, and that inherently 
limits the scale at which it can be used.”207  Conversely, metadata can be analyzed almost 
entirely by computer programs, with only the final analytical connections needing human 
intervention. 
 When the NSA or another intelligence agency believes it has located the phone 
number, landline or wireless, of a terrorist suspect, it will examine every call or text that 
number has made or received, capturing the telephony metadata of every number found.  
This is called a “hop.”  After that, the agency may “hop” again once or twice, depending 
on how far an official decides is necessary.
208
  This can result in thousands and thousands 
                                                 
207
 Matt Blaze, “Phew, NSA is Just Collecting Metadata.  (You Should Still Worry),” Wired, June 
19, 2013, http://www.wired.com/2013/06/phew-it-was-just-metadata-not-think-again/ 
208
 Philip Bump, “The NSA Admits it Analyzes More People’s Data than Previously Revealed,” 
The Wire, July 17, 2013, http://www.thewire.com/politics/2013/07/nsa-admits-it-analyzes-more-peoples-
data-previously-revealed/67287/ 
  
71 
of numbers—and thus people—being “targeted” in this manner because of one single 
suspect.  When used on internet traffic metadata, rather than telephony metadata, the 
implications are even grander; according to research scientists from Facebook and the 
University of Milan, “the average number of acquaintances separating any two people in 
the world…[is] 4.74.”209  This means that those three “hops” potentially gives the NSA 
access to tens of millions of people’s metadata. 
 
Arguments for Effective Use 
 Immediately following the revelations of widespread metadata seizures and 
surveillance efforts by the NSA, members of the intelligence community began publicly 
defending the efficacy of the programs involved.  In his June 6
th
, 2013 press release 
response to the first of the Snowden leaks, DNI Clapper stated that “[a]cquiring this 
information [metadata from Verizon] allows us to make connections related to terrorist 
activities over time.”210  Others have noted the efficacy of related programs in deterring 
and negating “the cyber threat facing the United States.”211  Even the president, a former 
critic of the intelligence community and constitutional law professor,
212
 voiced his 
opinion soon after the leaks, saying that “by sifting through this so called metadata, they 
[the IC] may identify potential leads with respect to folks who might engage in 
terrorism… [M]y assessment…was that [these programs] help us prevent terrorist 
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attacks.”213  Six months later, he added that he “felt that they made us more secure, but 
also…nothing…indicated that our intelligence community has sought to violate the law  
or is cavalier about the civil liberties of their fellow citizens.”214 
In response to the Snowden leaks, Duke University sociology professor Kieran 
Healy wrote a tongue in cheek piece entitled “Using Metadata to Find Paul Revere,” 
explaining how metadata could have been used by the British government to destroy the 
American Revolution before it even began.  While intended to be humorous, the blog 
post also highlights the incredible capability of metadata analysis, showing how using 
Samuel Adams, a known revolutionary, as a starting point, just a few “hops” would 
pinpoint Revere as the key figure within the various revolutionary groups connected to 
every independence group and almost every member of those groups. (See Figure 11)
215
  
Ironically, although Healy was trying to cast a negative light on these programs with his 
writing; it also makes the point that metadata has the potential to be incredibly effective 
in the fight against terrorism. 
 General Hayden also spoke of the effectiveness of these types of programs, both 
in their own right and for the fact that they “force [the] enemy into less efficient modes of 
communication.”  While explaining that he would always prefer to intercept most of an 
enemy’s, in this case terrorists’, communications, “[i]f you take away the agility, 
flexibility, that’s a plus.”216  This is backed up in terrorist literature, such as the aptly 
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titled online handbook “How to Survive in the West,” which was anonymously published 
in the summer of 2015.  With some paranoia about the NSA’s capabilities, the guide says 
that  
if you mention the name Osama on a phone, your phone conversation will 
suddenly get extra triggered by space agencies.  Whereas if you spoke casually 
and described him instead, your phone would be recorded (everyones [sic] phone 
conversations are), but it probably would be ignored unless there was already 
some suspicion/case against you.
217
 
 
Regardless of the accuracy of this statement, it clearly shows that the NSA’s efforts have 
been rewarded on one level by forcing terrorists to adapt to new methods of 
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communicating, which at worst slows them down, and at best disrupts active planning 
and plotting.  In light of the massive uptick in terrorist plots directed at the west in the 
last two years, this has a great deal of value.
218
 
 Claims of efficacy do not just come from the current administration and former 
NSA officials.  In one slide from the XKEYSCORE presentation, the NSA itself claimed 
to have captured over 300 terrorists using the program. (See Figure 12)
219
  This does not 
say specifically whether or not any of those terrorists were in the United States, but either 
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way, if true, that is a significant number of enemies to have removed from a global, 
irregular battlefield.   
Even then-Senator Mark Udall (D-CO), a noted critic of the programs revealed by 
Edward Snowden and a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) 
during his one term in the Senate, defended PRISM, saying in the days after the leaks that 
“it’s been very effective.”220  Together with Senator Ron Wyden (D-UT), Udall led the 
charge against what he viewed as illegal and invasive intrusions into the private lives of 
American citizens,
221
 so having his endorsement of one of these programs is a powerful 
argument for its effectiveness. 
Another unlikely supporter of PRISM and other 702 programs is the PCLOB.  
The PCLOB is a congressionally chartered independent agency intended to  
analyze and review actions the executive branch takes to protect the Nation from 
terrorism, ensuring that the need for such actions is balanced with the need to 
protect privacy and civil liberties; and ensure that liberty concerns are 
appropriately considered in the development and implementation of laws, 
regulations, and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against 
terrorism.
222
 
 
After being given several briefings on the program’s operations, technical details, and 
procedure rules by officials from the IC and Department of Justice,
223
 the Board, in a 
report requested by a ‘bipartisan group of U.S. Senators…[and] House Minority Leader 
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Nancy Pelosi,”224 stated that Section 702 “has proven valuable in the government’s 
efforts to combat terrorism as well as in other areas of foreign intelligence.”225  Indeed, 
PRISM allegedly “generated an average of four items per day for the President’s daily 
intelligence briefing in 2012.”226 
 Combined, the programs authorized under Sections 215 and 702 are claimed by 
former NSA Director Keith Alexander to have assisted in the prevention of forty two 
terrorist plots and twelve arrests for material support to terrorism.
227
  This needs to be 
examined in the context of potential harm to Americans’ civil liberties, but it is not an 
insignificant number of plots that have been foiled. 
 
Arguments for Ineffectualness 
For every argument, there is a counter, and this is equally true in the case of the 
effectiveness of the 215 and 702 programs.  For every person in favor of these tools as 
important pieces in the counterterrorism puzzle, there is someone disagreeing and 
espousing the opinion that they are ineffective, wastefully expensive, or both.  Though 
Senator Udall argued for PRISM’s effectiveness, he was adamant that the 215 programs, 
which pulled in metadata, were far less important, saying “I am not convinced that it’s 
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uniquely valuable intelligence that we could not have generated in other ways.”228  The 
PCLOB agreed again, with its report on the 215 program arguing that it 
has shown minimal value in safeguarding the nation from terrorism.  Based on the 
information provided to the Board, including classified briefings and 
documentation, we have not identified a single instance involving a threat to the 
United States in which the program made a concrete difference in the outcome of 
a counterterrorism investigation. Moreover, we are aware of no instance in which 
the program directly contributed to the discovery of a previously unknown 
terrorist plot or the disruption of a terrorist attack.  And we believe that in only 
one instance over the past seven years has the program arguably contributed to the 
identification of an unknown terrorism suspect. Even in that case, the suspect was 
not involved in planning a terrorist attack and there is reason to believe that the 
FBI may have discovered him without the contribution of the NSA’s program.229 
According to the Washington Post, unnamed Obama Administration officials admitted 
that this was the case, acknowledging “that it had contributed in just one case involving 
material support for terrorism,” rather than thwarting an actual attack.230 
 According to NSA officials who spoke with Washington Post reporter Ken 
Dilanian in March of 2015, the agency “considered abandoning its secret program to 
collect and store American calling records in the months before leaker Edward Snowden 
revealed the practice…because some officials believed the costs outweighed the meager 
counterterrorism benefits.”  Though there was doubt that General Alexander would 
approve the shutdown, there was a significant push from “top managers” to do so.  Part of 
this was the ineffectiveness of the program itself, and part was due to the “high costs of 
vacuuming up and storing the ‘to and from’ information from nearly every domestic 
landline call…[while the] program was not central to unraveling terrorist plots.”  David 
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Medine, the chairman of the PCLOB, said that while NSA officials had “put on a pretty 
strong defense for the program…their success stories didn’t pan out.”231 
 The very thing that makes these programs potentially successful also makes them 
extremely difficult to use.  Deputy Attorney General James Cole told the House’s 
intelligence oversight committee that “if you’re looking for a needle in the haystack, you 
have to get the haystack first.”232  The issue with that assertion is that one would even be 
able to find the needle.  After all, the needle in a haystack analogy is used to denote a 
search that is either impossible or so close to it that there is no point in even making the 
attempt.  Thus, the assertion that “they need to compile a giant haystack of data to find 
needles quickly”233 is, prima facie, absurd.  With even the Obama administration 
admitting that “Section 215 has been useful in a discrete number of terrorism cases,” 
there is no strong argument that it is actually an effective tool that has been presented by 
anyone except the NSA itself, which has a vested interest in keeping an extremely 
expensive, technologically advanced program active. 
 This apparent lack of success on the part of the 215 programs brings into question 
their value.  Considering the incredible cost in man hours, technology, and infrastructure, 
not to mention legal costs and the realized risk of it becoming, as one NSA senior staffer 
told Dilanian some in the agency feared, “deeply controversial if made public,”234 it 
seems logical that the correct course of action would have been shutting them down well 
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before Edward Snowden even began leaking information.  Additionally, as officials knew 
then and Congress has codified now, all metadata records would still have been available 
through FBI initiated subpoenas and warrants through the phone companies, which 
maintain the data for billing purposes.
235
 
 Considering the support throughout both the intelligence community and from 
outside, presumably independent observers and critics such as the members of the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, for the 702 programs such as PRISM, it is 
impossible to deny their effectiveness; any questions about them will come down to 
issues of legality, personal privacy and the Fourth Amendment requirements for searches 
and seizures.  215 programs, on the other hand, have little to no support, and are so 
cumbersome and expensive that it is difficult to imagine how the money, time, and brain-
power (both human and computer) poured into them are not being wasted.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 “The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent and need not be further 
urged—All that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as 
possible.  For upon Secrecy, success depends in Most Enterprizes [sic] of the kind, and 
for want of it, they are generally defeated.”236  These words are as true today as they were 
in 1777 when George Washington wrote them, and they are the reason that the American 
people cannot be privy to every piece of information about their government’s actions, as 
many would prefer.  However, the people do have the right to know some things, and 
when their rights are violated, or government commits waste or fraud, it is within the 
purview of the people to object.  In this case, there is one set of programs that the United 
States federal government used that some people inside and out of the intelligence 
community objected to based on their legal issues and efficacy; and a second set of 
programs that are effective and still legally questionable, but are well accepted to be 
useful, efficient, and important.  These are the 215 and 702 programs, respectively.  So 
the question becomes, at a time when “Congress and the nation are…divided about the 
proper balance between liberty and security,”237 what to do with them? 
Senator Frank Church may have best described the risks involved with programs 
such as these when, in 1975, he spoke the following words to describe the capabilities of 
the federal government in signals intelligence: 
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The United States government has perfected a technological capability that 
enables us to monitor the messages that go through the air…. That capability at 
any time could be turned around on the American people, and no American would 
have any privacy left, such is the capability to monitor everything—telephone 
conversations, telegrams, it doesn’t matter.  There would be no place to hide.238 
 
Senator Church would be astounded by the capabilities of the NSA today, but he would 
also likely be horrified.  No place to hide, indeed; virtually every American over the age 
of ten has a smartphone, tablet, or laptop, if not all of the above, all of which are 
connected to the internet or mobile network, and are thus potentially subject to some kind 
of monitoring by the National Security Agency.  Failure to place checks and limits on this 
kind of power has led to a situation where the potential for abuse is indeterminably high.   
To those who would say that safeguards are in place, with people watching over 
the system for abuses, Thomas Jefferson answers:  “In questions of power, then, let no 
more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of 
the Constitution.”239  Recent NSA officials have even caused concerns for their 
predecessors, as General Hayden was said to have remarked on the “heartburn” that 
General Keith Alexander, who followed him as NSA director, caused him with his 
methods and approaches towards collection, which was said to take the attitude of “[l]et’s 
not worry about the law.  Let’s just figure out how to get the job done.”240  This kind of 
attitude must not be allowed to pervade any portion of the United States government, but 
particularly not the military and intelligence communities. 
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Righting those wrongs needs to be the first step, and is a good start down the path 
toward reconciling the actions of government with the Constitution.  The next step must 
be to immediately and permanently discontinue all warrantless collections of data, meta 
or otherwise, on American citizens and U.S. persons.  Any warrants currently issued by 
FISA courts should be invalidated unless and until they have been reviewed by the judges 
serving on the Circuit Courts of Appeal in which each target is located, and they must 
meet both the traditional and constitutionally mandated standard of probable cause.  
Programs such as the sharing of information derived from warrantless collection of 
metadata with domestic law enforcement must immediately halt as well, with exceptions 
for exigent circumstances. 
This is not to say that the programs must be shut down.  The NSA can and, 
indeed, should track any non-U.S. persons who are not on American soil as it sees the 
need to; it is tasked with the collection of signals intelligence, and it should do just that, 
provided it does not violate the rights of United States citizens and others in American 
territory.  Pulling data from American servers and switches is also acceptable in the case 
of non-U.S. person information (i.e. European phone or internet traffic that has only 
entered the United States due to the location of the servers and infrastructure the provider 
uses), as long as the companies involved either agree to provide such information 
willingly or are subject to a court order from a standard federal court.  In certain cases, 
the third party doctrine could be applied, but it should be used sparingly and only in the 
last resort. 
9/11 increased popular awareness about what threatens the United States.  In the 
years following, the intelligence services did things that they would never have imagined 
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prior to that clear Tuesday morning’s horrors, including waterboarding and 
“extraordinary” rendition by the Central Intelligence Agency,241 the infiltration of 
mosques by Federal Bureau of Investigation agents,
242
 and General Hayden opting 
against the tradition of “play[ing] a bit back from the line,” and instead barreled full 
speed ahead through it.  As Bamford has described it, “the NSA had long been 
‘gatherers’…they would become ‘hunters.’243  
Stewart A. Baker, an NSA General Counsel in the early to mid-1990s, said that 
“[t]oday the risk to civil liberties is largely theoretical.  However theoretical [those] 
risks…may be, they cannot be ignored.”244  General Hayden spoke of “conceptual liberty 
loss.”  “This is about reasonable decisions that free people have to make all the time.  
Balancing two things, which are both virtues:  security and liberty.”245  Both are right, in 
that much of what is at risk is not concrete or immediately harmful, but must be viewed 
skeptically, looking for balance; the key, however, is that rather than “all ties” going to 
more collection, they must lean towards more constitutional protectionism. 
Even former NSA employees are speaking out against the agency, urging 
potential applicants to look elsewhere for work.  Charles Seife, a Princeton educated 
“Director’s Summer Program” NSA recruit from the early 1990s, and now a professor at 
New York University, wrote a lengthy open letter in Slate in August of 2013 decrying his 
                                                 
241
 See John Rizzo, Company Man:  Thirty Years of Controversy and Crisis in the CIA (New York, 
NY:  Scribner, 2014), for explanations of the thinking and rationale behind such actions. 
242
 Jerry Markon, “Mosque Infiltration Feeds Muslims’ Distrust of FBI,” December 5, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/04/AR2010120403720.html 
243
 Bamford, The Shadow Factory, 108 
244
 Bamford, Body of Secrets, 450-51 
245
 Hayden, in discussion with the author, September 21, 2015 
 84 
once-held “idealistic vision that we were doing something to help our country.”246  
Although he does state that the agency did work that legitimately improved national 
security, at the time the rules—and the circumstances—were different.  Now he sees 
abuses and urges his former colleagues—both those still working and retired—to speak 
out against those misapplications of NSA authority, stating: 
I can only guess how much more horrified the ex-NSAers I know—you, my 
former colleagues, my friends, my professors, and my mentors—must be. Unlike 
me, you have spent much of your working lives helping the NSA build its power, 
only to see your years of work used in a way it was never supposed to be used. 
You could speak out now in a way that violates neither your secrecy agreement 
nor your honor. It's hard to believe that the professors I know at universities 
around the country would remain silent as the NSA abuses their trust and misuses 
their work.
247
 
 
Altering the process by which the NSA obtains metadata, as prescribed in the 
USA FREEDOM Act, is a good start; companies holding this data for themselves, rather 
than being compelled to hand it to the government, is a significant improvement over the 
previous system wherein the NSA simply seized the data.
248
  This system is still not 
perfect, as the standard being used is still “reasonable and articulable suspicion,” below 
that of probable cause.
249
  It also fails to address the issues inherent in the FISA Court, 
but it is a step in the right direction. 
Former NSA employees and critics William Binney, Thomas Drake, and Kirk 
Wiebe—all of whom consider themselves whistleblowers for their parts in revealing what 
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they saw as wasteful NSA programs in the early 2000s
250—have said that the USA 
FREEDOM Act does not alleviate the concerns expressed by Seife.  Wiebe declared in 
April 2015 that the bill would simply be “more of the same” and was “not going to 
change anything.”251   
In the corporate technology sector, on the other hand, there was general approval 
for the new bill after its passage in June of 2015.  Google and Facebook both issued 
statements after President Obama signed the USA FREEDOM Act into law supporting 
the new statute.  A Facebook vice president, Susan Molinari, wrote that the “vote 
represents a critical first step toward restoring trust in the Internet, but it is only a first 
step.  We look forward to working with Congress on further reforms in the near 
future.”252  Symantec, a major information technology security company, issued a 
statement praising the bill that “strikes the right balance between protecting national 
security and the privacy of citizens around the world,” while calling the measure “long 
overdue.”253 
What the tech sector failed to acknowledge is that the USA FREEDOM Act’s 
authors neglected to void the constitutionally indefensible reasonable, articulable 
suspicion standard used in the obtaining court orders from the FISC to search and seize 
data from telecommunications companies.  The Fourth Amendment clearly defines what 
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is needed to obtain a warrant, and while the new architecture meets the specificity 
requirement, it fails to meet the probable cause standard.  Emergent situations aside, RAS 
is not a legitimate standard for a search or seizure, and the Supreme Court has said this 
many times.  The use of the Terry v. Ohio standard in everyday activity is a clear 
violation of the legal precedent, and should be ended in subsequent legislation.  
Violation of constitutional protections has other negative effects beyond simply 
the harm, or potential harm, to American citizens.  Among the potential ramifications is 
an impact on government recruiting efforts.  The NSA prides itself on its people, and well 
they should; the agency “is said to be the largest employer of mathematicians in the 
United States and perhaps the world.”  It employs “[a]nalysts, engineers, 
physicists,…linguists, and computer scientists” in untold numbers.254  Certainly there are 
thousands of brilliant, highly skilled, and highly educated people working there who 
could easily make significantly more money in the private sector, but have, for a variety 
of reasons, chosen to work for the United States government.   
In March of 2015, National Public Radio broadcast a story examining the 
difficulties the NSA was beginning to have recruiting the talented young people they 
need, focusing on a young man who grew up with the intentions of one day working at 
the agency located not far from his childhood home.  This young man, Daniel Swann, 
was finishing up a dual Bachelor’s and Master’s degree at Johns Hopkins in 
cybersecurity, and “is exactly the type of person the National Security Agency would 
love to have working for it.”  But in the wake of the Snowden leaks, for all of Swann’s 
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prior intent and expectations, he decided not even to apply.  “I can’t see myself working 
there…partially because of these moral reasons,” he said.255 
According to the NPR story, 
[t]his year, the NSA needs to find 1600 recruits.  Hundreds of them must come 
from highly specialized fields like computer science and mathematics. So far, it 
says, the agency has been successful. But with its popularity down, and pay from 
wealthy Silicon Valley companies way up, agency officials concede that 
recruitment is a worry. If enough students follow Daniel Swann, then one of the 
world's most powerful spy agencies could lose its edge.
256
 
 
Considering the importance of the National Security Agency, losing talent of that nature 
could be devastating to the United States.  Actions to prevent this concern from becoming 
reality must be taken.  That does mean increasing pay to compete, at least peripherally, 
with private companies, but also it requires mitigating concerns and moral qualms that do 
not exist when a computer programmer or math genius goes to work at Facebook or Intel. 
Adding a new moral or ethical component into the calculation of potential recruits 
will make it even more difficult for NSA to recruit qualified talent.  Edward Snowden 
claimed he was leaking documents because of his objections to government surveillance 
possessing the potential ability to put “limits [on] the boundaries of [users’] 
exploration”257 of the internet; this kind of thought process is likely to resonate with a 
group of young people that have spent their lives pushing those boundaries.  Computer 
experts have been especially difficult to attract to government—particularly law 
enforcement—because of ultra-strict security background requirements, and so rules have 
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had to be relaxed or reconsidered to attract that group.
258
  Providing new reasons for 
those particular specialists to decide not to apply to an organization as vital to the 
nation’s security and military strength as the National Security Agency is exactly the 
wrong thing to be doing.  Even if the issues with the secret programs revealed in leaked 
documents are being exaggerated by anti-surveillance zealots—and both Laura Poitras 
and Glenn Greenwald would certainly qualify—the appearance is enough to cause many 
people to rethink the decision to apply or accept a job at the NSA.  The inherent secrecy 
of the intelligence community makes any leak seem bigger, more explosive, and more 
controversial than the facts would lend an insider to believe, but to those looking in from 
the outside, the details can be scandalous and damaging. 
The moral questions involved with this do not stop with applicants or even current 
employees of NSA or its IC counterparts.  Americans pride themselves on being citizens 
of a country that holds the moral high ground and is a leader in the international 
community.  Much of that stems from the U.S. Constitution, a document that enumerates 
rights that Americans hold dear and which provides protections for such civil liberties as 
free speech, fair trials, and freedom from overly aggressive government invasion of 
privacy.  It becomes far more difficult to lecture other nations on their governments’ 
abuses of civil liberties when the U.S. federal government is conducting intelligence 
operations that include the potential for serious abuses of its own.  Even where actual 
abuse does not occur, the appearance that it could is problematic for many within and 
outside the United States.  The actions of government are always ripe for interpretation 
by experts and laypersons alike; in a situation like the collection of metadata where a 
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customer has no real expectation that their metadata will not be collected and exploited 
by his or her service provider for billing and marketing purposes, the extra step of 
providing that information to the government without a warrant or any allegation of 
criminal activity is easily viewed as abusive and overly intrusive. 
More concerning than the current legal issues with the programs is the potential 
for future abuse.  During the early years of the Cold War, President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower posited that if South Vietnam fell to the communist forces of the North, it 
would trigger a chain reaction in the region, resulting in the fall of capitalism throughout 
Southeast Asia.
259
  The same types of concerns are present when examining issues of 
domestic intelligence collection.  If government is allowed to conduct a few programs 
that violate the Constitution in the name of security, what is to stop it from doing more?  
The current “issue of the day” is terrorism, but tomorrow could easily bring a return to 
the days where the most important matter for government is the War on Drugs and 
suddenly instead of being used to search for foreign terrorists, the NSA is targeting U.S. 
drug dealers using the public health crisis that is the heroin epidemic in the Northeast 
United States
260
 as an excuse.  The Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution 
could be cited as justification for this about face as easily as it can be applied to the 
current usage of the NSA’s metadata collection programs.  No one can predict what the 
next crisis to face the United States will be, but with any calamity will come calls for 
government to do something, anything, to stop the next threat, regardless of what it may 
be. 
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 A similar argument is already playing out in the federal courts, with Apple and 
the Department of Justice fighting over whether a company can be required to write code 
that would open a “backdoor” for law enforcement to defeat the encryption that is 
currently protecting the cell phone of an American terrorist.  DoJ contends that the 
software would only be for a specific device, while Apple argues that it could potentially 
be used to affect all similar pieces of hardware.
261
  This controversy, which is part of a 
greater argument on encryption of personal devices, has even pitted the NSA against the 
FBI, with Admiral Mike Rogers, NSA’s current director, arguing against encryption 
backdoors while FBI Director James Comey demands that companies make it easier for 
law enforcement to access encrypted cell phones, tablets, and computers.
262
  At a time 
when end-to-end encryption is becoming more common and simple to use for even 
people who are not technologically proficient,
263
 criminals ranging from child-
pornography peddlers to drug dealers are able to take advantage of systems that the 
government will be unable to crack in all but the most limited circumstances.  In this 
case, terrorists can use the same types of programs as common criminals, and if the U.S. 
government (or any other nation’s intelligence service, for that matter) does manage to 
locate a phone number, e-mail address, or other identifier, exploitation of that 
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information has become significantly more difficult.  Add in the fact that terrorists are 
instructed to switch phones regularly to avoid being tracked,
264
 and suddenly the IC is 
faced with a moving target that it would take a “billion billion years” to decrypt;265 in 
other words, more than 200 million times longer than Earth has been in existence.  This 
debate is not nearly over, even though the Department of Justice has withdrawn one of its 
lawsuits against Apple demanding assistance in unlocking an iPhone.
266
 
While this issue is by no means the same as the concern over NSA being able gain 
access to Americans’ email and phone data, it is part of a greater debate over the role of 
law enforcement and the intelligence community where national security, privacy, and 
emerging technology all come together.  As Marc Goodman, a technology expert and 
“futurist” who has worked with the FBI, Interpol, and in municipal law enforcement, 
wrote, 
The more we plug our devices and our lives into the global information grid—
whether via mobile phones, social networks, elevators, or self-driving cars—the 
more vulnerable we become to those who know how the underlying technologies 
work and how to exploit them to their advantage and to the detriment of the 
common man.  Simply stated, when everything is connected, everyone is 
vulnerable.
267
 
 
While Goodman was discussing how criminals can take advantage of widespread 
connectivity, his point is equally applicable to the NSA and the rest of the American 
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intelligence community.  The near-ubiquity of wired and wirelessly connected devices, 
also known as the “internet of things,” has made NSA’s job both more difficult by 
increasing the amount of collectable data, and much simpler by making available data 
and communication information that would have been nearly impossible to obtain even 
ten years ago, much less during the Cold War era.  Patrick Tucker, another “futurist,” 
wrote that the “rate by which we can extrapolate meaningful patterns from the data of the 
present is quickening as rapidly as is the spread of the Internet because the two are 
inexorably linked.  The Internet is turning prediction into an equation.”268  This will only 
become truer in the future as technology advances, giving intelligence agencies 
increasingly more targets for collection.  The more data-points that are available to 
collect and analyze, the clearer the image of how people live their lives will become.  
Tucker explained that  
[t]he little actions, transactions, and exchanges of daily life do have a 
rhythm…and correspond to one another in a manner not unlike a melody… If 
you’re like most people, your life has a certain routine… Any tune composed of a 
repetitious sequence of notes becomes predictable.  With sensors, geographic 
information systems, and geo-location-based apps, more of those notes become 
audible.
269
 
 
Although you can “turn down the signal that you’re sending out [by cutting your use of 
internet and global positioning system-enabled devices], that doesn’t actually make you 
less predictable.”270  Even the option of limiting data output will become increasingly 
difficult in the future as a greater percentage of the devices that average Americans use 
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on a daily basis are added to the “internet of things” and that output becomes automatic 
and normal.   
It is hardly noteworthy today when Facebook recognizes in which specific 
restaurant a user is dining, or Google Maps recommends the best route home at 5:00pm 
on weekdays because the Android operating system tracks when users come and go from 
common locations and determines what must be the user’s place of employment.  The 
opening scenario of Tucker’s book The Naked Future, wherein a smartphone in the future 
informs the user that when leaving work, he will run into an ex-girlfriend who will tell 
him that she is engaged, is not that far-fetched; a high powered computer with access to a 
combination of long-term metadata and location data plus Facebook posts for both people 
could easily determine that this scenario is likely to play out.
271
  Putting that kind of 
power into the hands of corporations is scary in its own way; putting it into the hands of a 
government that has repeatedly demonstrated that it has the capacity and will to break the 
law in times of what it considers dire need is legitimately terrifying if the right safeguards 
are not enacted. 
The standard for what is an emergency or a great necessity for the government is 
different for the al-Qa’ida hunting NSA post-September 11th, 2001 than it was for the 
paranoid J. Edgar Hoover and his civil rights activist hunting FBI in the 1960s.  General 
Hayden posited that the TSA’s intrusive searches would not have been upheld by the 
courts before 9/11; in the post-9/11 world, that agency is simply an accepted part of the 
hassle of flying.
272
  National changes in attitude can be rapid or gradual, but in either case 
without firm, clear laws in place the whims of the people or the government can be used 
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to justify actions that would previously have been anathema, and it is impossible to 
predict what will spur opinion change in these areas.  General Hayden wrote that 
“[a]voiding the hard choices creates a whipsaw effect, based on the perceptions of the 
moment, and ultimately costs us both freedom and security.”273 
 Tucker also correctly makes the point that “the worst possible move we as a 
society can make right now is demand that technological progress reverse itself.  This is 
futile and shortsighted.”274  Americans must instead adopt laws and regulations that do 
not restrict the technological abilities of private citizens, corporations, or even the NSA; 
rather, these laws need to restrict how the government can use its new technology.  
Rather than simply deploying a new piece of software because it will collect more 
intelligence, the NSA, FBI, and the rest of the IC need to have a process by which they 
vet that software both internally and with the oversight of Congress and experts who can 
examine it with disinterest.  This could include the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board, as it already has a similar role in examining programs, but this function would add 
a more proactive nature to the Board’s activities.   
This process would certainly take longer than simply using the in-house general 
counsels that each agency and the DNI employ, but it will help to ensure that the people 
have an unbiased arbiter protecting their rights.  Using an additional safeguard proposed 
by General Hayden, collaboration with the media through more openness,
275
 will also 
lead to a broadening of trust between the citizenry and the government and offers a new 
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form of oversight.  Obviously he did not mean tell the media everything that the NSA or 
CIA is doing, but giving them an explanation of what is happening, rather than a “no 
comment” every time, will allow journalists to provide more information to their readers, 
listeners, or viewers, and give people a more informed perspective on the issues at hand.  
It will also give the people an opportunity to form more nuanced, informed opinions on 
the validity, necessity, and legality of the intelligence community’s activities. 
As Matthew Aid wrote regarding the Bush Administration’s warrantless 
collection program:  
Sadly, it seems likely that it will take years before the classified storage vaults are 
opened and a better understanding of the NSA warrantless eavesdropping 
program becomes available.  Until then, it will be impossible for the American 
public to fully understand, much less appreciate, the implications of the NSA 
program and the culture of fear that gave birth to it and continues to sustain it 
today.
276
 
  
This sentiment applies as well today as it did when it was written in 2008.  The 
proselytizing about the risk of terrorism, by both the government and the media, poses as 
great a danger to the rights of Americans as any other single portion of the equation that 
leads to programs such as those described herein.  There is no doubt that the best 
intentions motivated the production and implementation of PRISM, XKEYSCORE, and 
the myriad of other systems that cause concern among civil liberty advocates, but in this 
case, it is not the thought that counts.  The United States “Constitution… shall be the 
supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby.”277  That 
law is paramount, and the intelligence agencies can, and should, find ways to do their 
jobs protecting American lives and interests, within its bounds.  Either way, Senator Ron 
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 Aid, 299 
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 “Constitution of the United States:  Amendments 11-27,”  U.S. Archives, accessed January 29, 
2016, http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_amendments_11-27.html 
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Wyden said it best:  “The fight to protect Americans’ constitutional rights…is not 
over.”278  As long as there is a struggle between the rights of the people and the 
responsibilities of government, that fight will never be over, and never should be.  
Government needs to protect the people, and the people need to protect themselves from 
an overzealous government.  The passage of the USA FREEDOM Act was a step in the 
right direction.  Although nothing will ever satisfy everyone, a good outcome should be 
achievable provided that Congress, the executive, and the American people work together 
to find the right balance.   
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A 
All bolding is added by the author, and is intended to highlight a relevant section.  
Several irrelevant amendments and sections have been removed. 
 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America 
Amendment I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a 
redress of grievances. 
 
Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
 
Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land 
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or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
 
Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
 
Amendment IX 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to 
deny or disparage others retained by the people. 
 
Amendment XIV 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
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life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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Appendix B 
All bolding is added by the author, and is intended to highlight a relevant section.  
Several irrelevant sections have been removed. 
 
The Constitution of the United States of America 
Preamble 
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish 
justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the 
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do 
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. 
 
Article I 
Section 1. All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the 
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. 
Section 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each 
state, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one 
vote. 
Section 8. The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and 
excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of 
the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the 
United States; 
To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning 
captures on land and water; 
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To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for 
a longer term than two years; 
To provide and maintain a navy; 
To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; 
To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress 
insurrections and repel invasions; 
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing 
such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving 
to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of 
training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; 
To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not 
exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of 
Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like 
authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which 
the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other 
needful buildings;–And 
To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution 
the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the 
government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. 
Section 10. No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of 
marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and silver 
coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law 
impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility. 
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Article II 
Section 2. The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the 
United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual 
service of the United States; he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal 
officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of 
their respective offices, and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for 
offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. 
He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, 
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public 
ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United 
States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be 
established by law: but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior 
officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads 
of departments. 
 
Article III 
Section 1. The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, 
and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. 
The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good 
behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which 
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. 
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Section 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under their authority;–to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers 
and consuls;–to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;–to controversies to 
which the United States shall be a party;–to controversies between two or more 
states;–between a state and citizens of another state;– between citizens of different 
states;–between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, 
and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects. 
In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which 
a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other 
cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to 
law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall 
make. 
 
Article IV 
Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican form 
of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of 
the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against 
domestic violence. 
 
Article VI 
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in 
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
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authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges 
in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any 
State to the contrary notwithstanding.
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Appendix C 
All bolding is added by the author, and is intended to highlight a relevant section.  
Several irrelevant sections have been removed. 
 
Executive Order 12333--United States intelligence activities 
Timely and accurate information about the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of 
foreign powers, organizations, and persons and their agents, is essential to the national 
security of the United States. All reasonable and lawful means must be used to ensure 
that the United States will receive the best intelligence available. For that purpose, by 
virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States 
of America, including the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and as President of 
the United States of America, in order to provide for the effective conduct of United 
States intelligence activities and the protection of constitutional rights, it is hereby 
ordered as follows: 
Part 1 
Goals, Direction, Duties and Responsibilities With Respect to the National Intelligence 
Effort 
1.1Goals. The United States intelligence effort shall provide the President and the 
National Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions 
concerning the conduct and development of foreign, defense and economic policy, and 
the protection of United States national interests from foreign security threats. All 
departments and agencies shall cooperate fully to fulfill this goal. 
(a) Maximum emphasis should be given to fostering analytical competition among 
appropriate elements of the Intelligence Community. 
(b) All means, consistent with applicable United States law and this Order, and with 
full consideration of the rights of United States persons, shall be used to develop 
intelligence information for the President and the National Security Council. A balanced 
approach between technical collection efforts and other means should be maintained and 
encouraged. 
(d) To the greatest extent possible consistent with applicable United States law and this 
Order, and with full consideration of the rights of United States persons, all agencies 
and departments should seek to ensure full and free exchange of information in order to 
derive maximum benefit from the United States intelligence effort. 
1.7Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community. The heads of departments and 
agencies with organizations in the Intelligence Community or the heads of such 
organizations, as appropriate, shall: 
(a) Report to the Attorney General possible violations of federal criminal laws by 
employees and of specified federal criminal laws by any other person as provided in 
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procedures agreed upon by the Attorney General and the head of the department or 
agency concerned, in a manner consistent with the protection of intelligence sources 
and methods, as specified in those procedures; 
(d) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board, and keep the Director of Central 
Intelligence appropriately informed, concerning any intelligence activities of their 
organizations that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to 
Executive order or Presidential directive; 
(i) Ensure that the Inspectors General and General Counsels for their organizations 
have access to any information necessary to perform their duties assigned by this 
Order. 
1.12Intelligence Components Utilized by the Secretary of Defense. In carrying out the 
responsibilities assigned in section 1.11, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to utilize 
the following: 
(a) Defense Intelligence Agency, whose responsibilities shall include;  
(1) Collection, production, or, through tasking and coordination, provision of 
military and military-related intelligence for the Secretary of Defense, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, other Defense components, and, as appropriate, non-Defense 
agencies;  
(2) Collection and provision of military intelligence for national foreign 
intelligence and counterintelligence products;  
(3) Coordination of all Department of Defense intelligence collection 
requirements;  
(4) Management of the Defense Attache system; and  
(5) Provision of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence staff support as 
directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
(b) National Security Agency, whose responsibilities shall include:  
(1) Establishment and operation of an effective unified organization for signals 
intelligence activities, except for the delegation of operational control over certain 
operations that are conducted through other elements of the Intelligence 
Community. No other department or agency may engage in signals intelligence 
activities except pursuant to a delegation by the Secretary of Defense;  
(2) Control of signals intelligence collection and processing activities, including 
assignment of resources to an appropriate agent for such periods and tasks as 
required for the direct support of military commanders;  
(3) Collection of signals intelligence information for national foreign intelligence 
purposes in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;  
(4) Processing of signals intelligence data for national foreign intelligence 
purposes in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;  
(5) Dissemination of signals intelligence information for national foreign 
intelligence purposes to authorized elements of the Government, including the 
military services, in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central 
Intelligence;  
(6) Collection, processing and dissemination of signals intelligence information 
for counterintelligence purposes;  
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(7) Provision of signals intelligence support for the conduct of military operations 
in accordance with tasking, priorities, and standards of timeliness assigned by the 
Secretary of Defense. If provision of such support requires use of national 
collection systems, these systems will be tasked within existing guidance from the 
Director of Central Intelligence;  
(8) Executing the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense as executive agent 
for the communications security of the United States Government;  
(9) Conduct of research and development to meet the needs of the United States 
for signals intelligence and communications security;  
(10) Protection of the security of its installations, activities, property, information, 
and employees by appropriate means, including such investigations of applicants, 
employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations with the NSA 
as are necessary;  
(11) Prescribing, within its field of authorized operations, security regulations 
covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling and distribution 
of signals intelligence and communications security material within and among 
the elements under control of the Director of the NSA, and exercising the 
necessary supervisory control to ensure compliance with the regulations;  
(12) Conduct of foreign cryptologic liaison relationships, with liaison for 
intelligence purposes conducted in accordance with policies formulated by the 
Director of Central Intelligence; and  
(13) Conduct of such administrative and technical support activities within and 
outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions described in 
sections (1) through (12) above, including procurement.  
1.14The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Under the supervision of the Attorney General 
and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may establish, the Director of 
the FBI shall: 
(a) Within the United States conduct counterintelligence and coordinate 
counterintelligence activities of other agencies within the Intelligence Community. When 
a counterintelligence activity of the FBI involves military or civilian personnel of the 
Department of Defense, the FBI shall coordinate with the Department of Defense; 
(b) Conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States in coordination with 
the CIA as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence 
and the Attorney General; 
(c) Conduct within the United States, when requested by officials of the Intelligence 
Community designated by the President, activities undertaken to collect foreign 
intelligence or support foreign intelligence collection requirements of other agencies 
within the Intelligence Community, or, when requested by the Director of the 
National Security Agency, to support the communications security activities of the 
United States Government; 
 
Part 2 
Conduct of Intelligence Activities 
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2.1Need. Accurate and timely information about the capabilities, intentions and activities 
of foreign powers, organizations, or persons and their agents is essential to informed 
decision-making in the areas of national defense and foreign relations. Collection of such 
information is a priority objective and will be pursued in a vigorous, innovative and 
responsible manner that is consistent with the Constitution and applicable law and 
respectful of the principles upon which the United States was founded. 
2.3Collection of Information. Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized 
to collect, retain or disseminate information concerning United States persons only in 
accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and 
approved by the Attorney General, consistent with the authorities provided by Part 1 of 
this Order. Those procedures shall permit collection, retention and dissemination of the 
following types of information: 
(a) Information that is publicly available or collected with the consent of the person 
concerned; 
(b) Information constituting foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, including such 
information concerning corporations or other commercial organizations. Collection 
within the United States of foreign intelligence not otherwise obtainable shall be 
undertaken by the FBI or, when significant foreign intelligence is sought, by other 
authorized agencies of the Intelligence Community, provided that no foreign 
intelligence collection by such agencies may be undertaken for the purpose of 
acquiring information concerning the domestic activities of United States persons; 
(h) Information acquired by overhead reconnaissance not directed at specific United 
States persons; 
(i) Incidentally obtained information that may indicate involvement in activities that 
may violate federal, state, local or foreign laws; and 
2.4Collection Techniques. Agencies within the Intelligence Community shall use the 
least intrusive collection techniques feasible within the United States or directed 
against United States persons abroad. Agencies are not authorized to use such 
techniques as electronic surveillance, unconsented physical search, mail 
surveillance, physical surveillance, or monitoring devices unless they are in 
accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and 
approved by the Attorney General. Such procedures shall protect constitutional and 
other legal rights and limit use of such information to lawful governmental 
purposes. These procedures shall not authorize: 
(a) The CIA to engage in electronic surveillance within the United States except for the 
purpose of training, testing, or conducting countermeasures to hostile electronic 
surveillance; 
(b) Unconsented physical searches in the United States by agencies other than the FBI, 
except for:  
(1) Searches by counterintelligence elements of the military services directed 
against military personnel within the United States or abroad for intelligence 
purposes, when authorized by a military commander empowered to approve 
physical searches for law enforcement purposes, based upon a finding of probable 
cause to believe that such persons are acting as agents of foreign powers; and  
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(2) Searches by CIA of personal property of non-United States persons lawfully in 
its possession.  
(c) Physical surveillance of a United States person in the United States by agencies other 
than the FBI, except for:  
(1) Physical surveillance of present or former employees, present or former 
intelligence agency contractors or their present of former employees, or applicants 
for any such employment or contracting; and  
(2) Physical surveillance of a military person employed by a nonintelligence 
element of a military service.  
(d) Physical surveillance of a United States person abroad to collect foreign intelligence, 
except to obtain significant information that cannot reasonably be acquired by other 
means. 
2.5Attorney General Approval. The Attorney General hereby is delegated the power 
to approve the use for intelligence purposes, within the United States or against a 
United States person abroad, of any technique for which a warrant would be 
required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes, provided that such 
techniques shall not be undertaken unless the Attorney General has determined in 
each case that there is probable cause to believe that the technique is directed 
against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Electronic surveillance, as 
defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, shall be conducted in 
accordance with that Act, as well as this Order. 
2.8Consistency With Other Laws. Nothing in this Order shall be construed to 
authorize any activity in violation of the Constitution or statutes of the United 
States. 
2.12Indirect Participation. No agency of the Intelligence Community shall participate 
in or request any person to undertake activities forbidden by this Order. 
Part 3 
General Provisions 
3.4Definitions. For the purposes of this Order, the following terms shall have these 
meanings: 
(a) Counterintelligence means information gathered and activities conducted to protect 
against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for 
or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist 
activities, but not including personnel, physical, document or communications security 
programs. 
(b) Electronic surveillance means acquisition of a nonpublic communication by 
electronic means without the consent of a person who is a party to an electronic 
communication or, in the case of a nonelectronic communication, without the 
consent of a person who is visibly present at the place of communication, but not 
 124 
including the use of radio direction-finding equipment solely to determine the 
location of a transmitter. 
 (d) Foreign intelligence means information relating to the capabilities, intentions 
and activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons, but not including 
counterintelligence except for information on international terrorist activities. 
  
(7) The staff elements of the Director of Central Intelligence.  
 (i) United States person means a United States citizen, an alien known by the 
intelligence agency concerned to be a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated 
association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident 
aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation 
directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments. 
3.5Purpose and Effect. This Order is intended to control and provide direction and 
guidance to the Intelligence Community. Nothing contained herein or in any 
procedures promulgated hereunder is intended to confer any substantive or 
procedural right or privilege on any person or organization. 
 
 
